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Managerial Fixation and the Limitations of 
Shareholder Oversight 
 EMILY WINSTON†  
BlackRock’s recent public letters to the CEOs of the companies in which it invests have drawn 
substantial attention from stock market actors and observers for their conspicuous call on corporate 
CEOs to focus on sustainability and social impacts on non-shareholder stakeholders. This Article 
explores the market changes that propelled BlackRock into a position to make such a call, and whether 
institutional shareholders can be effective monitors of these broad social goals. It argues that while 
corporate attention to non-shareholder stakeholders can improve firm value, shareholder oversight of 
these stakeholder relationships will not succeed in having this effect. 
In the past several decades, U.S. institutional shareholders have come to exert significant influence over 
corporate managers. In the wake of this shift, concerns have arisen about how shareholders are using 
their power to influence corporate managers. Described herein as “managerial fixation” on 
shareholders, these discussions raise concerns about negative stakeholder impacts and a loss of firm 
value. 
The team production theory of corporate law explains why, when shareholders are disproportionately 
influential, other stakeholders’ interests will be neglected to the detriment of corporate value. This 
theory leaves open the question of why shareholders cannot simply use their influence to remedy the 
problem. This Article fills that gap. 
Even when shareholders are financially incentivized to use their power to promote the interests of other 
stakeholders, they will lack the information about stakeholder relationships necessary to do so 
effectively. This asymmetry of information means that shareholders cannot incorporate stakeholder 
information into their assessment of firm value, so managing to shareholder expectations will not 
maximize the value created by stakeholder relationships. Thus, a solution to managerial fixation must 
entail reducing shareholders’ proportional influence over managerial decision-making vis-à-vis the 
corporation’s other stakeholders. This Article concludes by offering two proposals for governance 
mechanisms that would encourage this reallocation of managerial attention. 
 
 †  Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. I am grateful to Jennifer Arlen, Dan 
Barnhizer, Anat Beck, David Blankfein-Tabachnick, Margaret Blair, Curtis Bridgeman, Patrick Corrigan, Sarah 
Dadush, Lisa Fairfax, Cathy Hwang, Ben Means, Ed Rock, Veronica Root, Jeff Schwartz, Helen Scott, Greg 
Shill, and Katy Yang for very helpful comments and conversations. I also owe substantial gratitude to the 
participants in the National Business Law Scholars Conference, the Law and Society Association Annual 
Meeting and the NYU Lawyering Scholarship Colloquium. All errors are my own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
BlackRock is the world’s largest asset manager with $6.84 trillion of assets 
under management as of June 30, 2019.1 That is, it is the largest among a global 
class of institutional investors that pool the smaller investments of individuals 
and other institutions (such as pension funds) and invest them on behalf of their 
clients. Each year, BlackRock’s chief executive, Larry Fink, publishes a “Letter 
to CEOs” that is addressed to the CEOs of the corporations in which BlackRock 
invests on behalf of its clients. The letter describes BlackRock’s strategies and 
priorities for the upcoming year and elucidates what it will be looking for in the 
companies in which it invests. Given BlackRock’s prominent position in the 
capital markets, this letter is usually eagerly anticipated and extensively 
analyzed in the business press. The 2018 letter, entitled “A Sense of Purpose,” 
ignited a great deal of commentary due to its conspicuous call on corporate 
CEOs to focus on sustainability and impacts on non-shareholder stakeholders.2 
To encourage this “sense of purpose,” Fink states in his letter that 
BlackRock will devote additional resources to more effectively engaging with 
corporate managers on issues of long-term growth and stakeholder 
relationships.3 While the letter is artfully phrased to leave open a number of 
possible paths forward for BlackRock, the commitment of resources and 
discussion of increased engagement with managers implies an expanded role for 
BlackRock in holding corporations accountable for their stakeholder impacts.4 
 
 1. Introduction to Blackrock, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/sg/en/introduction-to-blackrock 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2020).The next two largest asset managers are Vanguard and State Street which, together 
with BlackRock, are often referred to as the “big three.” Combined, the “big three” manage over $11 trillion of 
assets. Taken together, they represent the largest shareholder in ninety percent of S&P 500 firms. Given their 
ubiquity as substantial shareholders, the “big three” are watched closely by corporate managers and other market 
observers. Their relatively large shareholdings grant them substantial influence over corporate managers. Jan 
Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate 
Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 298–300 (2017). 
 2. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) 
[hereinafter Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs] (“To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver financial 
performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society. Companies must benefit all of their 
stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in which they operate.”). Fink 
wrote an updated letter in 2019, which extends this theme. The 2019 letter did not garner as dramatic a reaction 
as the 2018 letter, likely because it is not as novel and merely builds on the themes from the 2018 letter. See 
Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs: Purpose & Profit, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/ 
investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). His 2020 letter focusses on climate change 
and corporate environmental impacts. See Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental 
Reshaping of Finance, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2020). 
 3. Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs, supra note 2 (“We . . . intend to double the size of the investment 
stewardship team over the next three years [to] . . . foster even more effective engagement with your company 
by building a framework for deeper, more frequent, and more productive conversations.”). 
 4. While other plausible interpretations exist, this Article focuses on the interpretation that Fink expects 
corporate CEOs to be accountable, in some manner, to BlackRock for their corporations’ impacts on other 
stakeholder groups. 
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One of the most-cited reactions to Fink’s letter was from billionaire 
investor Sam Zell, who lamented during a television interview, “I didn’t know 
Larry Fink had been made God.”5 While this reaction was clearly an expression 
of frustration with Fink’s position, it also draws attention to the extent to which 
Fink’s letter was a departure from existing norms and potentially an expansion 
of BlackRock’s influence. This raises two questions. First, what has changed in 
the U.S. public equity markets that caused a prominent shareholder like 
BlackRock to call for socially responsible management by CEOs?6 Second, will 
the approach that the letter represents—shareholder oversight of corporate social 
impacts—succeed? This Article explores these two questions and concludes that 
(1) Fink’s letter was precipitated by a decades-long trend of shareholder 
empowerment which gave rise to concerns about corporate governance, and (2) 
regardless of their incentives, influence and investment horizon, shareholders 
cannot effectively serve as monitors of social impact. 
Corporations are a government creation that originated from a desire to 
create a structure that would enable business enterprises to commit large 
amounts of capital to long-term pursuits in furtherance of the public interest. The 
motivation behind establishing the corporate form was to create an entity that 
simultaneously furthers the interests of both investors and other constituencies. 
Corporations provide employment, goods and services, and investment returns, 
all of which can create a positive social impact, though they can also contribute 
to negative externalities such as environmental degradation. Thus, the interests 
of the various parties affected by corporate actions—its stakeholders—can be 
symbiotic. Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, there is a substantial 
extent to which positive impacts on non-shareholder stakeholders can increase 
returns to shareholders. Fink’s letter calls on corporate CEOs to capitalize on 
this coincidence of interests.  
For close to a century now, discussions about corporate governance and 
regulation have focused on concerns about shareholder-manager agency costs.7 
The central concern raised by these discussions is that dispersed and passive 
shareholders will be unable to monitor corporate managers, to the detriment of 
firm value. In recent years, however, these agency costs have diminished 
 
 5. Berkeley Lovelace, Jr., Billionaire Sam Zell: BlackRock’s Larry Fink is “Extraordinarily 
Hypocritical” to Push Social Responsibility, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/16/sam-zell-blackrock-
ceo-fink-is-hypocritical-to-push-social-responsibility.html (last updated Jan. 16, 2018, 10:33 AM). 
 6. This Article does not assume that Larry Fink is entirely sincere about the benevolent position he 
espouses in his letter. The letter, however, was in response to widespread calls on institutional shareholders to 
use their power to redirect corporate attention to other stakeholders. See infra Subpart II.B. Other prominent 
institutional shareholders have also heeded this call and published similar communications. See Business 
Roundtable Redefines the Purposes of a Corporation to Promote “An Economy that Serves All Americans”, 
BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-
purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans. The analysis herein is not an 
evaluation of the likelihood that Larry Fink, specifically, will succeed in his purported efforts to refocus 
corporate CEOs on social issues. Rather, it is an evaluation of whether this approach—institutional shareholders 
using their ample influence monitor other stakeholder impacts—will be successful.  
 7. See infra Subpart II.A.1 
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substantially. Developments in financial theory led to extraordinary growth in 
institutional investments, which have dramatically reduced the dispersion of 
shareholdings.8 Regulatory efforts aimed at increasing shareholder influence, 
together with the private proxy advisory industry, have reduced investor 
passivity and collective action problems. With this newfound influence, 
institutional shareholders have been able to press corporations to amend their 
charters and bylaws to increase their power further. Thus, what was once 
considered the “master” economic problem facing corporations has substantially 
diminished.9 
In the wake of these changes, however, new concerns have arisen about the 
apparent downsides of highly empowered shareholders. Often discussed under 
the heading of concerns about “short-termism,”10 these discussions point out that 
in corporate managers’ zealous efforts to please shareholders, other corporate 
stakeholders’ interests appear to have been devalued. This Article argues that 
this apparent stakeholder neglect derives not from a subgroup of shareholders 
with particularly short investment horizons, but more broadly from the 
disproportionate influence of public shareholders as a class. Thus, even very 
long-term shareholders such as BlackRock (or its competitors) can be 
contributors, rather than solutions, to this problem. This Article therefore uses 
the term “managerial fixation” to describe this perceived lack of attention to non-
shareholder stakeholders in order to emphasize the role of managerial attention 
to shareholders and de-emphasize distinctions in investment horizons. 
Somewhat ironically, this lack of attention to non-shareholder stakeholders is 
widely believed to come at the expense of long term firm value and thereby 
returns to shareholders themselves.11 So, substantially reducing the problem of 
shareholder-manager agency costs does not appear to have worked to 
unequivocally maximize firm value. 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production theory of corporate law 
provides a useful framework for understanding why concerns about managerial 
fixation have arisen in the wake of shareholder empowerment. The team 
production theory argues that shareholder power is properly limited because 
shareholders are only one of many constituencies whose firm-specific 
investments are necessary for corporate production.12 The inputs of other 
stakeholders such as creditors, customers, employees, suppliers and the 
 
 8. Institutional investors currently hold eighty percent of U.S. equity securities. Charles McGrath, 80% 
of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 25, 2017, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-
institutions#. 
 9. Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1910–
11 (2013). 
 10. Refers to the idea that corporate managers may be making decisions to please shortsighted shareholders 
at the expense of long-term, sustainable growth. 
 11. See infra Subpart I.B. 
 12. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 
247, 250 (1999). 
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environment are also necessary for a corporation to produce goods and services, 
and a successful corporation must take steps to attract optimal quantities of those 
inputs as well. Under this theory, if shareholders become disproportionately 
influential, managerial attention will be drawn away from the other stakeholders 
to the detriment of firm value.  
The team production theory largely predicts recent concerns about 
managerial fixation. It predicts that disproportionately powerful shareholders 
would divert managerial attention from other stakeholders. It also predicts that 
this managerial fixation will come at the expense of firm value, giving 
shareholders ample incentives to solve the managerial fixation problem. Team 
production leaves open the question of whether shareholders can simply use 
their substantial influence to monitor and optimize corporations’ stakeholder 
impacts. Observers concerned with short-termism have called on influential 
shareholders to do precisely that, and Fink’s letter is a response to that call. This 
Article seeks to fill this gap and argues that such efforts will inevitably be 
ineffective because shareholders lack access to the information necessary to 
effectively evaluate the interests of other stakeholder groups. 
Public shareholders are not perfectly informed. Corporate managers have 
access to information about their firms to which public shareholders do not have 
access. Prominent in this category of private information is information about 
the corporation’s relationships with its non-shareholder stakeholders. 
Corporations’ relationships with their stakeholders are governed by agreements 
that are, to varying degrees, incomplete. At-will employees and customers, in 
particular, have very incomplete agreements with corporations, meaning most, 
if not all, terms of agreement are not explicitly specified. Even the more specific 
contracts, such as those with suppliers and creditors, will still have unspecified 
terms and will need to be negotiated repeatedly over the course of the 
corporation’s life. Stakeholder agreements are therefore the subject of ongoing 
negotiations between firm managers and the relevant stakeholders. Managing 
these relationships is the role of a corporate manager, and it exposes managers 
to vital information about those stakeholder relationships to which shareholders 
are not privy. This information is not reducible to metrics that can be effectively 
transferred to shareholders, and public shareholders, by their nature, are not 
positioned, nor do they have the expertise, to be intimately involved in the 
management of other stakeholder relationships. Thus, information asymmetries 
will prevent shareholders from being effective monitors of other stakeholder 
interests. 
The implication of this analysis is that shareholders’ proportional share of 
managerial attention should be reduced vis-à-vis that of other stakeholders. The 
usual objection to any reduction in shareholder power is that eliminating 
shareholder oversight essentially frees managers to pursue their own interests at 
the corporation’s expense. While some managerial rent-seeking may well result 
from reducing shareholder influence, the magnitude of that cost is far from clear. 
And, as this Article demonstrates, there can be costs associated with 
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disproportionately empowered shareholders as well. So, concerns about 
managerial agency costs should not overshadow the potential costs of 
managerial fixation. Nonetheless, shareholders may be able to direct managerial 
attention to other stakeholders while reducing the likelihood or magnitude of 
agency costs by pressuring corporations to look internally to adopt stakeholder-
protective procedures and mechanisms. They can do this by pressing for 
corporate responsibility reporting to the board of directors and stakeholder 
metrics in executive compensation formulas. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the 
fundamental social and economic functions of corporations, and defines the 
boundaries of the analysis herein. Part II describes the principal-agent problem, 
how it has diminished in recent decades, and the resulting concerns about 
managerial fixation. Part III summarizes the team production theory of the 
corporation and its implication that shareholder empowerment has come at the 
expense of firm value. It then describes how shareholders are limited in their 
ability to use their power to monitor corporate outcomes for other stakeholder 
groups. Part IV proposes two ways in which shareholders can use their 
substantial influence to encourage managers to direct meaningful attention to 
other stakeholder relationships. 
I.  CORPORATIONS’ SIMULTANEOUS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
While Fink’s call for attention to corporate social outcomes may have come 
as a surprise to many modern market observers, the ability of corporations to 
serve broad social and economic goals has long been a core characteristic of the 
corporate form. This Part briefly describes the socially-oriented origin of U.S. 
corporations, which sought to capitalize on the corporate form’s unique capacity 
to provide benefits for both shareholders and the broader public. It then explores 
the complexities of the relationship between a public corporation’s shareholders 
(such as BlackRock)13 and its other stakeholders (such as the employees, 
customers and communities that Fink mentions in his letter)14 and defines the 
parameters of the remainder of the analysis herein. 
A. THE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PURPOSE OF U.S. 
CORPORATIONS 
Corporations exist as a business entity type in the United States because 
state governments have enacted and maintained corporation laws that allow 
corporations to be formed in their states.15 The existence of corporations is 
 
 13. BlackRock holds shares on behalf of its investor clients. It is the registered owner and thus, votes the 
shares it holds for its clients, while its investor clients are the beneficial owners of the shares with a right to the 
economic benefits of the shares.” See, e.g., 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT, BLACKROCK 23 
(2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-report-2019.pdf 
(referring to BlackRock’s clients as “the asset owners”). 
 14. See Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs, supra note 2. 
 15. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2020). 
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therefore the result of government action, and corporations are often the objects 
of extensive governmental regulation and attention. Governments created the 
corporate form because of its potential to create unique social benefits, and 
governments regulate corporations largely in an attempt to control the negative 
externalities they create.16 
Historically, the first corporate charters in the United States were granted 
to organizations that today we would call charitable organizations, such as 
hospitals and universities.17 These organizations made direct requests to state 
legislatures for corporate charters. Governments were motivated to grant these 
charters to ensure these organizations could continue to provide public services 
notwithstanding the individual choices or circumstances of the contributors of 
capital.18  
As the U.S. economy developed and evolved, corporate charters were 
increasingly granted to more profit-driven endeavors such as banking and the 
construction of turnpikes, which, while not charitable, nevertheless provided 
important public services.19 These were endeavors that required substantial 
capital inputs, and that provided clear and important public services that would 
be substantially inhibited if capital contributors were able to withdraw their 
contributions.20 In the nineteenth century United States, as industrialization set 
in and business practices expanded their geographic scope, the utility of a 
corporate charter proved to have a much broader application. In an attempt to 
democratize the corporate form, states began to adopt statutes making corporate 
formation publicly available (that is, not requiring a specific appeal to a 
legislature for a charter),21 and the number of incorporated organizations 
increased dramatically.22 States adopted statutes allowing for the formation of 
corporations because they recognized the social utility of amassing capital from 
unrelated investors and directing it to business organizations that operated across 
geographic boundaries and over indefinite periods of time.  
With the advent of the corporation, equity investors were now protected 
from personal liability, not required to devote resources to actively managing 
 
 16. Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 351 (2017). 
 17. Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY BUS. 
L.J. 1, 11–12 (2004). 
 18. Without a corporate charter, the business activities of these institutions would have been treated as 
partnerships under the law. Partners were entitled to withdraw their share of the partnership’s assets upon 
request, and partnerships dissolved upon the death of a partner. These characteristics created uncertainty about 
the long or medium-term prospects of the partnership enterprise, which likely deterred investment. Granting a 
corporate charter allowed the organization’s assets to be held by a fictional “legal person,” permitting the 
organization to continue to provide important public services without interruption. Id.; see also Ralph Nader et 
al., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 33 (1976). 
 19. Blair, supra note 17, at 12–13. 
 20. As they could in the traditional partnership form. Id. at 20; Nader et al., supra note 18, at 34. 
 21. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 92 
(2018) (noting that when direct appeals to the legislature were required to form a corporation, charters tended to 
be granted predominantly to the wealthy and well-connected). 
 22. Nader et al., supra note 18, at 36–38. 
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the enterprise,23 and could sell their shares to an available buyer should they 
decide to end their investment. Moreover, equity holders were not permitted to 
withdraw their share of corporate assets, and the corporation survived its equity 
investors, giving investors greater assurance as to the long-term viability of the 
enterprise.24 With these advantages, businesses formed as corporations could 
more easily attract capital. Via the corporate form, a much broader swath of 
society could benefit from the social and economic contributions of business 
activity.  
As business professors Michael C. Jensen and William A. Meckling 
concluded in their seminal paper on the structure of the firm, “[t]he publicly held 
business corporation is an awesome social invention.”25 This is so because it 
encourages capital to flow from a broad array of relatively small investors to 
enterprises that can provide quality-of-life-enhancing goods and services to a 
large population over an extended period of time. The ability to simultaneously 
provide benefits to shareholders, consumers and other corporate stakeholders is 
therefore a foundational characteristic of the corporate form.26 
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHAREHOLDER AND OTHER STAKEHOLDER 
INTERESTS 
Acknowledging that the fundamental goal of corporations is to provide 
benefits to a variety of stakeholders raises the question of whether improved 
outcomes for non-shareholders contribute to or come at the expense of 
shareholder returns. The group of individuals impacted by a large, publicly 
traded corporation’s actions—its “stakeholders”—is very broad and extends 
well beyond shareholders. As corporations have expanded in size and 
geographic scope, this group has only grown. Scholars and observers have 
variously identified numerous categories of corporate stakeholders, including 
employees, directors, shareholders, creditors, customers, suppliers, 
 
 23. This is an important characteristic that is discussed further in Subpart III.B.3. 
 24. Blair, supra note 17, at 4, 7. 
 25. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 357 (1976). 
 26. Substantial debate exists over whether corporations should be managed with an explicit focus on their 
social impacts. See Emily Winston, Benefit Corporations and the Separation of Benefit and Control, 39 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1783, 1790–96 (2018). But even those who argue that corporations should be managed with 
no goal other than profits and shareholder returns, do so on the basis that this will result in the best economy-
wide social outcome. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/ 
1970/09/13/issue.html (describing the adverse social effects of managers spending corporate resources to 
promote “social” causes: “Insofar as his actions in accord with his ‘social responsibility’ reduce returns to 
stockholders, he is spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise the price to customers, he is spending the 
customers’ money. Insofar as his actions lower the wages of some employees, he is spending their money.”); 
see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
1637, 1644 (2013) (“[S]hareholder ability to intervene and engage with companies provides long-term benefits 
to companies, shareholders, and the economy.”). 
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governmental officials, communities, the environment, and society.27 Because 
of the diversity of interests at stake, it is highly possible that conflicts will arise 
among stakeholder groups—that is, that the promotion of one stakeholder 
group’s interests may come at the expense of the other. Given the longstanding 
focus on share price in corporate scholarship and practice (described in more 
detail in Part II herein), the question that most often arises is whether promoting 
the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders must result in a reduction in returns 
to shareholders.28 That is, will focusing on other stakeholder impacts simply re-
distribute some of the shareholders’ slice of the pie to other groups? Or, might 
improving returns to non-shareholder stakeholders result in a larger pie that also 
results in a larger slice for shareholders? The approach described in Fink’s letter 
is an effort to increase the size of the pie via attention to non-shareholder 
stakeholders. 
Many scholars have endeavored to empirically test the relationship 
between shareholder and other stakeholder interests. While such studies are 
quite numerous, they fail to conclusively answer the question.29 To highlight but 
a few divergent results, Allen Ferrell et al. compared firms’ indicators of 
corporate social responsibility to their indicators of managerial agency problems 
and found a positive relationship between socially responsible firm activity and 
firm value.30 In contrast, Kenneth Aupperle et al. surveyed firms to ascertain 
their social responsibility-orientation and found no relationship between social 
responsibility and profitability.31 Situated halfway between these two outcomes, 
 
 27. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 253 (identifying “employees, consumers, creditors, and other 
corporate ‘stakeholders’”); see also R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER 
APPROACH 31–32 (1984) (“The list of stakeholders originally included shareholders, employees, customers, 
suppliers, lenders and society.”); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the 
Corporate Objective Function, in U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3, 4 (Donald H Chew & Stuart L. Gillan eds., 
2009) (“Stakeholders include all individuals or groups who can substantially affect, or be affected by, the welfare 
of the firm—a category that includes not only the financial claimholders, but also employees, customers, 
communities and government officials.”); WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. & LARRY VRANKA, THE NEED AND 
RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS 
OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC, 5–6 n.21 (2013), http://
benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf (“Key stakeholders in a business 
organization include customers, directors, employees, shareholders, suppliers, the community from which the 
business draws its resources, etc.”). 
 28. The question of tradeoffs among non-shareholder stakeholders is also interesting but receives 
substantially less attention due to the historical primacy of shareholder interests. Though, as Part III will describe, 
the team production theory speaks to this issue.  
 29. See Michael L. Barnett, Stakeholder Influence Capacity and the Variability of Financial Returns to 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 794, 794 (2007) (“[A]fter more than thirty years of 
research, we cannot clearly conclude whether a one-dollar investment in social initiatives returns more or less 
than one dollar in benefit to the shareholder.”). 
 30. Allen Ferrell, et al., Socially Responsible Firms, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 585, 585 (2016) (“[W]ell-governed 
firms that suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control 
wedge, strong minority protection) engage in more CSR. We also find that a positive relation exists between 
CSR and value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value.”). 
 31. Kenneth Aupperle, et al., An Empirical Examination of the Relationship Between Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Profitability, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 446, 446 (1985) (“This study . . . did not find any 
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Shawn Berman et al. found that attending to non-shareholder stakeholders for 
strategic reasons enhances financial performance, whereas doing so for intrinsic 
reasons does not.32 While the balance of evidence seems to weigh in favor of a 
positive relationship between attention to non-shareholder stakeholders and firm 
value, these studies point in a number of different directions regarding whether, 
to what extent, and in what circumstances this relationship exists.33 
The difficulty in arriving at a determinative empirical conclusion about the 
relationship between shareholder and other stakeholder interests is not surprising 
given the diversity of stakeholder groups described above. We should expect 
results to vary based on which stakeholder groups are the subject of managerial 
attention, in what proportions, in what type of industry and in what type of 
business and political environment, among other factors.34 It is quite easy to 
imagine ways in which too much concern for non-shareholder stakeholders 
could shrink the corporate pie. Excessively high wages or excessively low prices 
could cause a corporation to be unprofitable. However, excessively low wages 
or high prices could have a similar effect. Thus, a definitive answer to the 
question of whether shareholders benefit from managerial attention to other 
stakeholders is unattainable. The question is simply too broad. 
Nonetheless, it should be uncontroversial that some level of attention to 
other stakeholders not only benefits shareholders, but is necessary to create any 
return to shareholders at all. A corporation must give some amount of attention 
to the needs of its employees in order to recruit and retain a workforce.35 
 
relationship between social responsibility and profitability. Specifically, varying levels of social orientation were 
not found to correlate with performance differences.”). 
 32. Shawn Berman, et al., Does Stakeholder Orientation Matter? The Relationship Between Stakeholder 
Management Models and Firm Financial Performance, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 488, 488 (1999) (“The results 
provide support for a strategic stakeholder management model but no support for an intrinsic stakeholder 
commitment model.”). 
 33. Empirical studies of this relationship are far too numerous to list here, but several additional examples 
include: Xin Deng, et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value Maximization: Evidence from 
Mergers, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 87 (2013) (finding that corporate acquirers with a stronger commitment to CSR 
performed better post-merger); Caroline Flammer, Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Reaction: 
The Environmental Awareness of Investors, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 758 (2013) (finding stock price increases 
following reporting of responsible environmental behavior by companies); Preston E. Lee & Harry J. Sapienza, 
Stakeholder Management and Corporate Performance, 19 J. BEHAV. ECON. 361 (1990) (finding most indicators 
of stakeholder performance are associated with conventional measures of corporate profitability and growth). 
But see Ing-Haw Cheng, et al., Do Managers Do Good with Other People’s Money? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 19432, 2013), https://www.nber.org/papers/w19432.pdf (finding that spending on 
CSR is partly due to agency problems).  
 34. See Barnett, supra note 29, at 795 (“The unique and dynamic characteristics of firms and their 
environments preclude stability in financial returns to CSR across firms and time, so we should not expect to 
empirically discern a consistent financial benefit—essentially, a universal rate of return—to a generic 
corporation for some given unit of social investment.”). 
 35. See Peter Georgescu, Just 100 Do Well by Doing Good, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2018, 8:39AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petergeorgescu/2018/01/10/just-100-well-by-doing-good/#125d3fd86335 
(“Increasingly, the only way to win is to treat your employees and customers as if they matter as much as your 
profits. . . . It’s counter-intuitive to think you will earn more by increasing the largest cost of doing business, 
your payroll. But it works.”). 
April 2020] MANAGERIAL FIXATION 711 
Likewise, it needs to attend adequately to the preferences of its suppliers in order 
to attract supplies, and to the needs of its creditors in order to attract credit. 
Similar statements can be made for other corporate stakeholders as well, and 
without these stakeholder inputs the corporation cannot produce anything.36 
Therefore, there is some minimum level of attention to non-shareholder 
stakeholders that is required in order for the corporation to earn any profits that 
it can return to shareholders. And, it is safe to assume that the amount of 
stakeholder attention that will maximize corporate output and firm value is 
somewhere above this bare minimum. So, up to a point, focusing on the effects 
of corporate activity on groups other than shareholders can be expected to have 
a positive impact on shareholder returns. Larry Fink’s letter appears inspired by 
a desire to reach that point, and this Article analyzes whether shareholders like 
BlackRock are capable of identifying the profit-maximizing mix of attention to 
non-shareholders stakeholders.  
C. PARAMETERS OF ANALYSIS 
While the potential coincidence of shareholder and other stakeholder 
interests is an important phenomenon that should be exploited, it is certainly not 
the case that profit-seeking behavior by corporations can cure all social ills. 
Acknowledging this limitation, the scope of the analysis in this Article is 
circumscribed in two important ways.  
First, not all stakeholder interests can be effectively promoted by corporate 
action. There will often be instances where responsibility for protecting 
stakeholder interests more appropriately and effectively falls to the government. 
Stakeholder interests can roughly be divided into three categories, depending on 
the extent to which corporate activity can effectively address them. 
The first category comprises stakeholder interests that cannot be 
adequately protected by corporate management alone. Corporations need to 
induce stakeholders to contribute to the firm, whether in the form of employee 
time, customer purchases, or any other relevant input. However, this corporate 
demand will only work for the benefit of stakeholders where adequate 
competition exists for their contributions. Where well-functioning markets do 
not exist for stakeholder inputs, stakeholder interests will require government 
protection. 
Perhaps most prominently, there is no naturally existing market for 
environmental inputs. As a public good, regulation is necessary to ensure that 
environmental resources are not depleted by corporate production. For other 
stakeholder groups, markets may naturally exist, but will require government 
intervention to function properly. For example, a well-functioning market for 
customers requires effective competition law, and the market for labor may 
require employment laws to ensure that employees have adequate bargaining 
 
 36. A corporation’s need to attract inputs from an array of stakeholders is the basis of the team production 
theory of the corporation, which is discussed in detail in infra Subpart III.A. 
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power to create a robust market for their labor.37 Interests in this first category 
require government intervention because corporate action alone cannot address 
them.  
The second category comprises stakeholder interests that could be 
addressed by governmental regulation, corporate management, or by some 
combination of the two. Examples of second category interests include family 
leave or product safety. These are issues for which a society may believe there 
is a minimum standard below which no corporation should be permitted to fall. 
It is the role of government to set that minimum standard. However, above the 
minimum standard, corporate managers can choose the level that will attract the 
optimal stakeholder inputs to maximize the value of corporate production. Thus, 
most issues in this category will involve both government and management 
intervention, and the scope of possible corporate intervention will be a function 
of the minimum standards set by the government. 
The third category comprises stakeholder interests that can only be 
effectively addressed by corporate managers. These interests include product 
development, employee development, and creating a culture of integrity and 
compliance.38 Product development is a means by which corporations meet their 
customers’ needs. Employee development and wellness programs are a means 
by which corporations further the interests of their employees in a manner that 
is specific to the corporation. And, creating a corporate culture of integrity and 
compliance promotes the interests of all stakeholders who are the beneficiaries 
of that integrity, including shareholders. These issues have very clear 
stakeholder impacts, but are very specific to the context of each individual 
corporation. As such, they are not appropriate areas for governmental 
intervention, and are instead issues to be addressed internally by corporate 
managers. Because this Article discusses corporate impacts on non-shareholder 
stakeholders, the discussion herein is limited to second and third category 
interests. 
An additional boundary of the discussion arises from acknowledging that 
the specific quantity and composition of corporate attention to stakeholders that 
maximizes returns to shareholders may not be the same package of stakeholder 
attention that maximizes the net social benefit of a corporation’s activities. 
While maximizing net social benefit is an appropriate goal for corporate activity 
 
 37. See, e.g., If Wages are to Rise, Workers Need More Bargaining Power, THE ECONOMIST (May 31, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/05/31/if-wages-are-to-rise-workers-need-
more-bargaining-power; Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the 
Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1947–48 (1996) (describing how the threat of unionization 
disciplines corporate managers). Indeed, even Milton Friedman contemplated an important role for labor unions 
in exerting pressure on corporate managers. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) 
(arguing that corporate managers have no “social” responsibility to their employees because employees have 
labor leaders to represent their interests). 
 38. While the securities laws may, appropriately, mandate compliance procedures, creating a culture that 
fosters compliance is dependent on firm management. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 
54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 949 (2017). 
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at a societal level, the analysis in this Article is more limited in scope. Fink’s 
letter is a response to calls on shareholders to use their influence to direct 
corporate attention to other stakeholders. Such calls are not made with the hope 
that institutional investors will do so altruistically, but rather are based on a 
belief that doing so will financially benefit most shareholders.39 Thus, in 
examining the limitations of the approach represented by Fink’s letter, the 
analysis herein is limited to the economic space wherein attention to non-
shareholder stakeholders can be expected increase returns to shareholders. 
On the basis of the discussion above, the remainder of this Article proceeds 
from the premise that some corporate attention to non-shareholder stakeholders 
is necessary to maximize corporate value, and that the Fink letter and the calls 
to which it is a response represent an effort to push corporate managers toward 
the profit-maximizing level of stakeholder engagement. To that end, it focuses 
on the economic area where the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders 
coincide.  
II.  CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. EQUITY MARKETS 
If attention to a corporation’s non-shareholder stakeholders is, at least 
sometimes, expected to be conducive to shareholder returns, then Fink’s letter 
seems unsurprising. He is merely asking BlackRock’s investee companies to 
turn their attention to issues that will likely have a positive effect on returns to 
BlackRock’s clients.40 Nonetheless, it came as a surprise to many observers 
because it was a departure from recent past practices. This begs the question: 
what has changed? If managerial attention to other stakeholders is necessary to 
maximize returns to shareholders, why have shareholders not always focused on 
this issue? And, why is anyone surprised they are doing so now? This Part 
describes the substantial changes that have occurred in U.S. public equity 
markets over the past several decades and the theory underlying many of these 
changes. It then describes the concerns about corporate impacts that have arisen 
in the wake of these changes and explains the impetus to call on powerful 
shareholders like BlackRock to address these concerns. 
  
 
 39. Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs, supra note 2. 
 40. It is quite possible that Fink’s purpose in crafting this letter was something other than a sincere intent 
to engage with BlackRock’s investee companies on issues of social responsibility. Several other plausible 
explanations exist, including that the letter is either an attempt to avoid future regulation or a marketing ploy. 
The sincerity of the letter is not relevant to the argument made here. See id. 
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A.  TODAY’S SHAREHOLDERS EXERT SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE OVER 
CORPORATE MANAGERS 
1. Theoretical Antecedent: Agency Cost Theory 
Concerns about shareholders’ limited ability to monitor corporate 
managers have dominated discussions about corporate activity for decades, but 
many of the changes that have taken place in U.S. public equity markets over 
the last several decades have, to an extent, assuaged these concerns.  
The origin of this discussion among U.S. legal scholars lies in Professors 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ famous 1934 book, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property.41 Berle and Means conceived of shareholders as the 
owners of the corporation who were granted only limited rights to control the 
managers who they hire as agents to run their corporation. Berle and Means were 
concerned that these limited rights left shareholders without adequate control 
over managers, who could in turn manage corporations in furtherance of their 
own interests and to the detriment of shareholders and the corporate enterprise.42 
That is, the “separation of ownership and control” meant that shareholders, as 
principals, faced agency costs arising from their inability to adequately control 
their manager “agents.” This concept was formalized into an economic theory 
by Professors Jensen and Meckling in 1976,43 and has continued to dominate 
conversations about corporate control among practitioners and academics.44 
Under this theoretical framework, the combined effects of legal constraints 
and the dispersion of share ownership in publicly traded corporations result in 
agency costs to shareholders. Corporate law in the United States grants 
shareholders only limited rights to control directors and officers, while primary 
 
 41. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1932). The earliest identification of this potential problem may have been in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations in 1776, where he pointed out the inadequate incentives facing managers who manage “other people’s 
money.” 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 311 (1776) 
(“The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money 
than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance 
with which the partners in a private copartner frequently watch over their own.”). 
 42. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 41, at 116 (“[I]t is therefore evident that we are dealing not only with 
distinct but often with opposing groups, ownership on the one side, control on the other— a control which tends 
to move further and further away from ownership and ultimately to lie in the hands of the management itself, a 
management capable of perpetuating its own position.”). 
 43. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 25. 
 44. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 248 (“Contemporary discussions of corporate governance have come 
to be dominated by the view that public corporations are little more than bundles of assets collectively owned 
by shareholders (principals) who hire directors and officers (agents) to manage those assets on their behalf.”). A 
sample of prominent literature studying managerial agency costs includes: Lucian Bebchuk, et al., What Matters 
in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The 
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 
(1999); Michael S. Rozeff, Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios, 5 
J. FIN. RES. 249 (1982). 
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responsibility for managing the corporation lies with the board of directors.45 
Shareholders have the right to elect directors, vote on major transactions, inspect 
corporate books and records and file derivative suits.46 These rights give 
shareholders the ability to approve of or intervene after board action, but they 
do not give shareholders the right to initiate any major corporate decisions.47 In 
theory, shareholders’ power to replace directors should incentivize directors to 
take actions that promote shareholders’ interests.48 However, in order for 
shareholders to use the limited rights they do hold to police corporate 
management, they must coordinate among themselves. Under state corporation 
law, a shareholder vote against corporate action requires a majority vote, and 
directors are elected by a plurality.49 Agency costs arise when shareholders 
cannot or do not organize to use these rights to ensure the firm is managed for 
their benefit. When shareholdings are widely dispersed among many 
shareholders holding small percentages of equity, collective action problems 
make such coordination difficult.50 
Concerns about shareholder-manager agency costs derive not only from 
concern about shareholders’ own financial interests, but also from a belief that 
shareholders are the stakeholder group best positioned to maximize the total 
value created by firms.51 This belief arises from characterizing shareholders as 
“residual claimants” to the corporation.52 That is, shareholders are the group 
entitled to receive “whatever remains after all revenues have been collected and 
all debts, expenses and other contractual obligations have been paid.”53 In the 
“classical firm” that underlies agency cost theories, it is assumed that the non-
shareholder stakeholders who contribute to the firm do so subject to contracts 
that specify the portion of firm value that each non-shareholder stakeholder will 
 
 45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2020) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under 
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise 
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”). 
 46. Id. at §§ 211–212, 220, 251(c), 327. 
 47. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 835, 836 
(2005) (“A central and well-settled principle of U.S. corporate law is that all major corporate decisions must be 
initiated by the board. Shareholders may not initiate any such decisions.”). 
 48. Id. at 837. Shareholders may also signal discontent by selling their shares, though this option’s 
availability is decreasing as more and more investors place their investments in index funds and ETFs, which 
invest in a particular group or “index” of companies and do not sell their shares unless a company no longer 
meets the criteria to be in the group. Dawn Lim, Index Funds Are the New Kings of Wall Street, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 18, 2019, 5:30 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-kings-of-wall-street-
11568799004. 
 49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216. But see infra Subpart II.A.2 (describing the recent trend of public 
corporations adopting majority voting provisions). 
 50. Professor Mark Roe has argued that the dispersion of shareholders in the U.S. equity markets is itself 
a result of U.S. legal rules. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). 
 51. Bebchuk, supra note 47, at 842–43 (“[I]ncreased shareholder power would be desirable only if it would 
operate to improve corporate performance and value.”). 
 52. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 291 (1992). 
 53. Id. 
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receive.54 With all amounts due to non-shareholder stakeholders fixed, the only 
way to increase the total amount of value created by the firm is to increase the 
“residual claim,” which goes to the shareholders. Thus, it is argued, shareholders 
should control corporations so that they can maximize the residual claim and 
therefore maximize firm value.55 If shareholders hire managers that they cannot 
adequately control, it is feared that managers will manage the corporation in a 
manner that improperly directs rents to the managers and therefore does not 
maximize firm value.56 These theories, which characterize shareholders as firm 
owners and residual claimants, have driven corporate law scholars to focus 
squarely on shareholder agency costs as the defining problem in corporate law. 
Subpart III.B will explore the ways in which real life corporations diverge 
from this classical model, and the implications for the limitations of shareholder 
oversight. In recent years, however, structural changes in the U.S. equity markets 
have empowered shareholders and therefore substantially reduced shareholder-
manager agency costs, providing an opportunity to evaluate the results of their 
reduction. The following Subpart details these changes. 
2. Shareholder Empowerment Trend 
Over the past several decades, a number of trends have emerged that, 
combined, have drastically increased shareholders’ influence over corporate 
management. The financial theories that facilitated these trends began to develop 
as early as the 1950s, while notable changes in the publicly traded equity markets 
accumulated over the following decades. 
a. The Foundations of Modern Financial Theory Demonstrated 
the Wisdom of Diversified Passive Investment 
In the 1950s through 1970s, several important financial theories were 
developed which continue to form the foundation of much thinking about 
financial markets. Modern portfolio theory, which originated in a paper by 
economist Harry Markowitz in 1952, describes how investment portfolios can 
be assembled to optimize or maximize expected return given the investor’s 
preferred level of risk.57 The capital asset pricing model, which established the 
tools to measure the risk, return and performance of investment portfolios, was 
also developed during this period.58 Then, around 1970, the Efficient Capital 
Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) was established in a paper by economist Eugene 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Via their residual control rights. “Residual control rights” refers to the rights to make decisions about 
the use of corporate assets that are not explicitly controlled by law or assigned to another by contract. Id. at 289. 
 56. See infra Subpart III.C. 
 57. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FINANCE 72, 77 (1952). 
 58. André F. Perold, The Capital Asset Pricing Model, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2004) (“The CAPM was 
developed in the early 1960s by William Sharpe (1964), Jack Treynor (1962), John Lintner (1965a, b) and Jan 
Mossin (1966).”). 
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Fama.59 The fundamental takeaway from the ECMH is that “in an efficient 
market, the price of an asset fully reflects all available information about that 
asset.”60 The groundbreaking implication of the ECMH is that active trading in 
pursuit of speculative gains is useless, so employing the services of professional 
traders cannot consistently result in above-average returns.61  
While these theories continue to be revised and questioned,62 the 
foundational concepts they established remain very influential. Their combined 
implication for investors is that a prudent investor will invest in a passively 
managed, diverse portfolio. 
b. The Consequent Institutionalization of Shareholdings 
Institutional investors became increasingly prominent beginning in the 
1980s in large part because they allowed individual investors to follow the 
investment advice suggested by the recently developed financial theories 
described above.63 Institutional investors pool the smaller investments of many 
and invest them according to some strategy developed by the institution. This 
pooling of investment assets creates economies of scale and allows investors to 
outsource investment decisions to experts.64 The message of the ECMH that 
above-market returns are not consistently attainable has drastically increased the 
popularity of index funds and exchange traded funds, which do not engage in 
active trading strategies.65 The result is that very few households currently own 
stock directly. Those households that own stock instead generally hold their 
shares through institutional intermediaries.66 
Institutional investors can take several forms and serve several purposes. 
BlackRock and its “big three” co-members, State Street and Vanguard, are 
prominent among these institutions.67 They invest money on behalf of 
individuals and also other institutions such as retirement plans, endowments, and 
 
 59. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 
383 (1970).The ECMH also has its origins in the work of Paul Samuelson. See Paul A. Samuelson, Proof that 
Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41 (1965). 
 60. ANDREW W. LO, ADAPTIVE MARKETS 16 (2017); Fama, supra note 59, at 384. 
 61. LO, supra note 60, at 23. 
 62. In particular, the perfect efficiency of markets has been widely and convincingly questioned in response 
to crises such as the dot-com bubble and the Great Recession. See, e.g., JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE 
RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009); LO, supra note 
60; Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59 (2003). 
 63. LO, supra note 60, at 27 (“It’s no exaggeration to say that the Efficient Markets Hypothesis was 
responsible for the emergence of the index mutual fund business.”). 
 64. POONEH BAGHAI ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., THE NEW GREAT GAME IN NORTH AMERICAN ASSET 
MANAGEMENT (2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/the-new-great-
game-in-north-american-asset-management. 
 65. Fichtner et al., supra note 1, at 298–300. 
 66. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge 
Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1872–73 (2017). In 2016, 
44.4% of the U.S. households held fund shares. INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 112 
fig.6.1 (57th ed., 2017). 
 67. See Fichtner et al., supra note 1, at 299. 
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insurance companies.68 Beyond the “big three,” there are many other smaller 
asset managers in the industry.69 Moreover, many institutions such as insurance 
companies, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds may also hold shares 
directly, without intermediation by an asset manager; thus they constitute 
another form of institutional investor.  
Important among the ecosystem of institutional investors are hedge funds, 
which also pool the capital of smaller investors but use riskier investment 
practices than other funds, such as leverage, investment in derivatives and short 
selling.70 A small but vocal subset of hedge funds also engages in activist 
strategies to force changes to the management of the companies in which they 
invest.71 Hedge funds engage in activism by acquiring a substantial equity 
interest in a publicly traded corporation and using that position to press for 
changes in the capital structure or business plan of the corporation.72 The fund 
presses for these changes because it believes they will increase the company’s 
share price and thus allow for returns to the fund’s investors upon sale of the 
shares. Activist hedge funds hold largely undiversified investments, giving them 
ample incentive to take on the costs of a campaign against corporate 
management.73 While activist funds constitute a small minority of hedge funds, 
their influence far exceeds their market share, and executives are widely fearful 
of hedge fund activism.74  
Importantly, activist hedge funds’ ability to engage in activism depends on 
the existence of other institutional investors with sizeable stakes in the target 
corporation. Hedge funds themselves take on a sizeable stake in their target 
companies, but given the enormous market capitalization of most publicly traded 
corporations, they cannot take on a majority stake. Thus, they rely on the votes 
 
 68. See, e.g., Our Clients, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/ca/institutional/en/our-
clients?nc=true&siteEntryPassthrough=true (last visited Mar. 20, 2020); Our Clients, THE VANGUARD GRP., 
https://about.vanguard.com/our-clients/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).  
 69. See Liam Kennedy, Top 400 Asset Managers 2018: 10 years of Asset Growth, INV. & PENSIONS EUR. 
MAG. (last visited Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.ipe.com/reports/special-reports/top-400-asset-managers/top-
400-asset-managers-2018-10-years-of-asset-growth/10025004.article. 
 70. SEC, HEDGE FUNDS INVESTOR BULLETIN HEDGE FUNDS (2012), https://www.sec.gov/ 
investor/alerts/ib_hedgefunds.pdf. 
 71. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1046 (2007) (noting only five percent of hedge fund assets were devoted to activist 
activities in 2006); Strine, supra note 66, at 1885–86 n.47. 
 72. Strine, supra note 66, at 1886. 
 73. John C. Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on 
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. LAW 545, 548 (2016). 
 74. See, e.g., THE ACTIVIST INVESTING ANNUAL REVIEW 2018, ACTIVIST INSIGHT 3 (2018), 
https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/5/v2/155375/The-Activist-Investing-Annual-Review-2018-HiRes.pdf 
(documenting the trend of increased activist activity over the last several years); Nabila Ahmed et al., The 
World’s Most Feared Investor, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-elliott-management/ 
(last updated Aug. 22, 2017); William D. Cohan, Starboard Value’s Jeff Smith: The Investor CEOs Fear Most 
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/12/03/starboard-capitals-jeff-smith-activist-investor-darden-
restaurants/. 
April 2020] MANAGERIAL FIXATION 719 
of other institutional shareholders to be able to credibly threaten to vote out 
directors. 75 
The percentage of institutional holdings of publicly traded stock has 
steadily increased since 1980.76 Institutional investors currently hold 
approximately eighty percent of U.S. equities.77 The result is that shareholdings 
today are much more concentrated than they have been historically. Institutional 
investors hold a larger percentage of shares in any one company than virtually 
any individual investor could. Thus, the dispersion of shareholdings, which was 
a principal impediment to shareholders’ ability to exercise their rights, has 
substantially decreased.  
c. Laws and Regulations Are Directed at Increasing Shareholder 
Influence Over Corporate Management 
While individual investors’ desire to diversify and invest passively resulted 
in more concentrated shareholdings, regulators, concerned about agency costs, 
simultaneously implemented legal and regulatory changes that increased the 
power of the shareholder franchise against a backdrop of state corporation law 
that is shareholder-focused.78 A few prominent examples are described below. 
In 1988, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued its “Avon Letter,” stating 
that investment advisers managing retirement accounts are required to cast a 
vote on every matter up for shareholder vote.79 The DOL considered voting these 
shares to be consistent with the advisers’ fiduciary duties. This imposed a voting 
requirement on many investment funds, increasing the number of shareholder 
votes cast in corporate elections.80 In 2003, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issued a similar rule, requiring investment advisers to “adopt 
 
 75. They may also rely on the support of other activist funds, a phenomenon referred to as “wolf pack” 
activism. See Strine, supra note 66, at 1871. 
 76. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 995–98 (2010); Serdar 
Çelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors and Ownership Engagement, 2013 OECD J. 93, 94 (2014), https://
www.oecd.org/corporate/Institutional-investors-ownership-engagement.pdf; OECD, OECD INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS STATISTICS 2009–2016 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-
institutional-investors-statistics-2017_instinv-2017-en#page1; Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, 
Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished 
Working Paper), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2147757. 
 77. See McGrath, supra note 8. 
 78. Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Organic Corporate Governance, 59 B.C. L. REV. 21, 41 (2018) 
(“Shareholder empowerment has been the focal point of immense regulatory and organizational resources in the 
past couple decades.”). Delaware, the state where most S&P 500 firms are incorporated, grants corporate 
managers substantial leeway in business decisions under the business judgment rule, but requires that business 
decisions have some nexus to shareholder returns. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 
1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2010) (clarifying that the promotion of a non-stockholder interests is not protected by the business 
judgment rule unless it will eventually lead to stockholder gain).  
 79. Daniel M. Gallagher, Outsized Power & Influence: The Role of Proxy Advisers 3 (Wash. Legal Found., 
Working Paper No. 187, 2014), http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/GallagherWP8-14.pdf; 
Re: Avon Products, Inc. Employee’s Retirement Plan, 1988 ERISA Lexis 19, at *6 (Feb. 23, 1988). Specifically, 
investment advisers of funds with twenty-five percent or more of fund shares held in retirement accounts. 29 
C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(f) (2020). 
 80. Gallagher, supra note 79, at 3–4. 
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policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the adviser votes 
proxies in the best interests of clients” and disclose information about those 
votes to their clients.81 This rule extended the influence of the Avon Letter 
beyond just funds managing substantial retirement accounts. 
In 1992, the SEC enacted changes to proxy rules to make it easier for 
shareholders to make 14a-8 shareholder proposals by limiting the circumstances 
under which doing so would trigger filing requirements and restrictions.82 Rule 
14a-8 requires corporations to include shareholder proposals in their proxy 
materials if certain requirements are met.83 Such proposals can address social 
and environmental issues, shareholder rights issues, or other corporate 
policies.84 While 14a-8 proposals are precatory and therefore non-binding, they 
can signal shareholder discontent to corporate managers. This reform therefore 
increases shareholders’ voice.85 Indeed, the ability to place shareholder 
proposals on the proxy statement was a key contributor to the fifth trend 
described below. 
In 2010, an amendment to New York Stock Exchange Rule 452 prohibited 
brokers from voting shares in director elections when they have not received 
instructions from their customers as to how to vote (“uninstructed shares”).86 
Prior to this amendment, brokers could vote uninstructed shares at their 
discretion.87 Because brokers tended to vote uninstructed shares in favor of 
management, this rule change reduced the number of shares voted in favor of 
management, increasing the relative weight of shareholder votes against 
management.88 
The 2011 “Say on Pay” rules adopted as a result of the Dodd Frank Act 
require an advisory (non-binding) shareholder vote on compensation packages 
 
 81. Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. IA-2106, 79 SEC Docket 
1673 (Jan. 31, 2003). 
 82. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). SEC ANN. REP. viii (1992), https://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/
1992.pdf. The 1992 rule changes limited the circumstances under which shareholder communications in advance 
of a proposal would be considered “proxy solicitations.” Proxy solicitations trigger filing requirements and 
restrictions. See Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms, 16 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 233, 236 (2000). 
 83. The requirements include a minimum stake in the company and requirements as to length of the 
proposal and timing for filing. If these requirements are not met, the corporation may exclude the proposal only 
if it falls into one of thirteen substantive categories that the SEC deems inappropriate for shareholder action. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8; Scott Lesmes, Frequently Asked Questions About Shareholder Proposals and Proxy 
Access, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (2017), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/frequently-asked-questions-
about-shareholder-proposals-and-proxy-access.pdf. 
 84. Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN (June 29, 2017), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/shareholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2017-proxy-season/ (noting that, 
in 2017, shareholder proposals on social issues were most common, followed by environmental, proxy access, 
and political disclosure). 
 85. Bird & Park, supra note 78, at 39 (“The shareholder proposal mechanism is the most widely recognized 
and formal method for shareholders to exercise their voice in corporate decision-making.”).   
 86. Howard B. Dicker et al., WEIL BRIEFING: SEC DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2009), 
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/Weil_Briefing_SEC_CG_July_9.pdf. 
 87. Id.   
 88. Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 874 (2010). 
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for executives.89 The “Say on Pay” rules are intended to allow shareholders to 
put management on notice if they are displeased with the compensation provided 
to executives. This rule gives corporate executives yet another incentive to 
please shareholders. 
This list is not comprehensive, and efforts to further empower shareholders 
via legislative or regulatory means continue.90 With respect to SEC rulemaking, 
the SEC’s mission prominently includes protecting investors,91 so it is 
unsurprising that it would regularly issue rules that “constrain management’s 
ability to disregard shareholder demands.”92 The effect of any regulation that 
enhances shareholders’ ability to influence management works to reduce the 
“separation of ownership and control.” 
d. Proxy Advisors Arise, Which Facilitate Coordination Among 
Institutional Shareholders 
In the midst of the abovementioned changes, a private industry of proxy 
advisory firms, or proxy advisors, arose. Proxy advisors compile and analyze 
information about publicly traded companies on the basis of which they make 
recommendations to institutional investors about how to vote their shares.93 
Proxy advisors became prominent in the 1990s to help the increasingly popular 
institutional investors reduce their costs of voting.94 In a minority of cases, an 
institutional investor will completely outsource its voting function to the proxy 
advisor. More often, the institutional investor will pay only for advice and a 
voting recommendation.95 The proxy advisory industry is extremely 
concentrated with one firm, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), enjoying 
dominant status and two firms (ISS and Glass Lewis) enjoying duopolistic 
control.96 
Proxy advisors enhance institutional investors’ ability to overcome 
collective action problems and substantially reduce the costs of complying with 
the DOL and SEC voting requirements. While the institutionalization of 
 
 89. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as 
Required Under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm. 
 90. See Lucian Bebchuk et al, Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
157, 158 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2014); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against 
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 669–73 (2010) (describing the “law-reform agenda” put 
forth by shareholder proponents to further empower shareholders through lawmaking). 
 91. Along with maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets and promoting capital formation. See The 
Role of the SEC, SEC https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/role-sec (last visited Mar. 20, 
2020). 
 92. Bird & Park, supra note 78, at 35. 
 93. Choi et al., supra note 88, at 870–71.  
 94. George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287, 1289 (2014). 
 95. Choi et al., supra note 88, at 870–71. 
 96. JAMES K. GLASSMAN & HESTER PEIRCE, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV., MERCATUS ON 
POLICY: HOW PROXY ADVISORY SERVICES BECAME SO POWERFUL 1 (2014), https://www.mercatus.org/ 
system/files/Peirce-Proxy-Advisory-Services-MOP.pdf.  
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shareholdings did notable work to reduce the collective action problems faced 
by shareholders, even with institutions’ relatively large shareholdings, they still 
rarely hold a controlling interest in a firm.97 Thus, coordination among 
shareholders is still required to garner enough votes to reject a management 
proposal. Moreover, many institutional investors, such as mutual funds and 
index funds, exist specifically to provide diversification and therefore are 
invested in a very large number of companies.98 So, even though institutions 
may hold a relatively large percentage of a corporation’s shares, the breadth of 
their holdings means that casting an informed vote at every company could be 
prohibitively costly. Proxy advisors enjoy economies of scale, and by 
disseminating recommendations widely to many institutional investors, they can 
make it easier for institutions to coordinate a vote against management. 
Moreover, the fact that there are only two real players in the proxy advisory 
industry bolsters their ability to coordinate votes, as the proxy advice available 
in the market is essentially limited to two perspectives which do not always 
diverge.99 
e. Shareholders Press for Changes Within the Corporation That 
Will Further Increase Their Influence 
As structural changes have condensed shareholdings, regulatory changes 
have increased shareholder influence, proxy advisors have decreased the cost of 
coordinated voting, and shareholders have utilized their newfound strength to 
press for changes within public corporations that further enhance their power. 
First, publicly traded corporations have moved away from plurality 
voting.100 Under Delaware corporate law, the vote of only a plurality, not a 
majority, of outstanding shares is required to elect a director.101 However, in 
recent years, institutional investors have exerted pressure on publicly traded 
corporations to adopt a majority-voting standard.102 As of 2015, close to ninety 
percent of S&P 500 firms had majority voting requirements.103 Requiring a 
majority vote makes it substantially more difficult for directors to win reelection, 
 
 97. Activist hedge funds typically have between six and eight percent when they go public with their 
campaigns. Strine, supra note 66, at 31. Large asset managers such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and Fidelity rarely 
hold more than a ten-percent stake in a corporation. See Fichtner et al., supra note 1, at 312 tbl.2. 
 98. WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE NOW 24 (2016). 
 99. GLASSMAN & PEIRCE, supra note 96. 
 100. Choi et al., supra note 88, at 872. 
 101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 216 (2020). 
 102. Majority Voting for Directors, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS., 
https://www.cii.org/majority_voting_directors (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) (“For many years CII has urged 
companies to adopt majority voting if a shareholder proposal to adopt the reform received majority support. In 
the summer of 2016 CII launched a broader campaign to encourage all companies in the Russell 3000 index to 
adopt majority voting, regardless of their history with related shareholder proposals.”). 
 103. Carol Bowie, ISS 2016 Board Practices Study, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REGULATION (June 1, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/01/iss-2016-board-practices-
study/. 
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and the threat of losing reelection makes directors eager to please 
shareholders.104 
Second, at shareholders’ behest, publicly traded corporations have been 
dismantling their staggered boards.105 Historically, most corporations had 
“staggered” or “classified” boards, meaning only one third of board members 
were up for election each year.106 Staggered boards constrain shareholders’ 
ability to force changes in management, because they can, at most, replace only 
one third of the board each year; replacing the entire board would take three 
years. In recent years, many institutional investors have pressured the companies 
in which they invest to “de-stagger” their boards.107 As of 2016, ninety percent 
of S&P 500 firms had “de-staggered” boards,108 giving shareholders more 
opportunities to remove directors and thus more influence over their decision 
making. 
Moreover, in 2010, under the authorization of the Dodd Frank Act, the SEC 
implemented “proxy access” rules to require companies to include in their proxy 
materials director candidates nominated by certain shareholders.109 However, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned the rule in 
2011.110 In the face of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, institutional shareholder 
activists effectively pressured many corporations to adopt bylaw changes 
establishing proxy access at the corporation level.111 As of February 1, 2018, 
sixty-five percent of S&P 500 companies had adopted proxy access 





 104. Choi et al., supra note 88, at 873. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Often with the assistance of Harvard Law School’s Shareholder Rights Project. 121 Companies Agreed 
to Move Towards Annual Elections, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT, http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/ 
companies-entering-into-agreements.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 108. Lyuba Goltser & Kaitlin Descovich, ISS Board Practices Study Reflects Focus on Board 
Accountability, WEIL GOVERNANCE & SEC. WATCH (Mar. 22, 2017), https://governance.weil.com/whats-
new/iss-board-practices-study-reflects-focus-on-board-accountability/. 
 109. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9136; 34-62764; IC-
29384, 99 S.E.C. Docket 694 & 439 (Aug. 25, 2010). 
 110. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 111. DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON 63–
70 (2018). 
 112. Corporate Governance Report: Proxy Access—Now a Mainstream Governance Practice, SIDLEY (Feb. 
1, 2018), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2018/02/proxy-access. 
 113. As of July 2017, only one instance of a shareholder using proxy access had occurred. Marc S. Gerber, 
Proxy Access: Highlights of the 2017 Proxy Season, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REGULATION (July 1, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/01/proxy-access-highlights-of-the-
2017-proxy-season/. 
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The cumulative result of these forces has been that corporate managers 
today are extremely attentive to shareholder concerns.114 The fact that 
shareholders have successfully pressed for majority voting, de-staggering boards 
and proxy access demonstrates the extent to which their influence had increased 
prior to those changes. With these changes in place, their influence can only be 
greater. Evidence is abundant that corporate directors and managers are now 
substantially more attentive to shareholder concerns than they have been in the 
past.115 And, the interaction among the various types of institutional 
shareholders means even institutions like BlackRock—which are often thought 
of as inactive shareholders—can exert significant sway over corporate managers 
because their votes will decide whether a hedge fund’s activist campaign 
succeeds.116 
Under the traditional principal-agent conception of the corporation, this is 
cause for celebration. What those theories deem the most important economic 
problem facing corporations appears to have largely been resolved.117 However, 
overcoming shareholder agency costs has not proven to be a panacea for 
optimizing corporate performance. Instead, in the wake of this apparent 
resolution of the agency costs problem, new concerns have arisen about how 
corporations are managed. 
  
 
 114. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 720–21; Kahan & Rock, supra note 76, at 995–98; Rock, 
supra note 9, at 1910–11. 
 115. See, e.g., MAURITIUS INST. OF DIR., ENGAGING WITH SHAREHOLDERS—A GUIDE FOR BOARDS, 4 
(2014), https://www.afcgn.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/engaging-with-shareholders-FINAL.pdf (“[O]ver 
the last few years, due to new developments in the global environment, shareholder engagement has taken a new 
dimension with the relationships between shareholders and issuers demanding more attention.”); Paula Loop et 
al., The Changing Face of Shareholder Activism, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REGULATION (Feb. 1, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/01/the-changing-face-of-shareholder-
activism/#more-104497 (providing advice to corporate managers on how to prepare for activism by institutional 
investors); Lisa Pham & Manuel Baigorri, Companies Engaging with Shareholders More to Avoid Public 
Activist Campaigns, BUSINESSDAY (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/companies/2017-12-27-
companies-engaging-with-shareholders-more-to-avoid-public-activist-campaigns/; SEC—NYU Dialogue on 
Securities Markets Regulation, Topic: Shareholder Engagement, YOUTUBE (Jan. 19, 2018) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QouhJ20J90U (discussing, at 2:58:20, how corporate directors are feeling 
the pressure of increased shareholder activism from both active and passive investors, and indicates that 
corporate boards are increasingly challenged by the task of attending to their corporations’ shareholders and 
proxy advisors). 
 116. John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 19 (Harvard Law 
School, Program on Corporate Governance Working Paper No. 2019-5, 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ 
ssrn.3247337 (“[I]ndex fund managers have and are increasingly using multiple channels to influence public 
companies of all sizes and kinds. Their views . . . matter intensely to the way the core institutions in the U.S. 
economy are operating. When a large company’s performance lags, it is at risk of being targeted by a hedge fund 
activist. When that occurs, the attitude of the index funds towards that company’s management and strategy will 
determine whether the index funds will support, oppose or be neutral regarding the hedge fund’s proposals. In 
decisions both ordinary and extraordinary, ranging from cost-cutting to technology investments, M&A 
transactions to expenditures on corporate compliance, the perceived pressure on the board will matter.”). 
 117. Rock, supra note 9, at 1910 (“[S]ince the early 1980s, the U.S. system has shifted from a manager-
centric system to a shareholder-centric system.”). 
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B. RECENT CONCERNS ABOUT CORPORATE ACTIVITY—“SHORT-TERMISM” OR 
“MANAGERIAL FIXATION” 
While the shareholder empowerment trend has worked to lessen the long-
concerning “separation of ownership and control,” many observers and market 
actors have raised new concerns about how shareholders are using this newfound 
power to influence corporate managers. These concerns are often referred to as 
concerns about “short-termism”—in reference to the idea that corporate 
managers may be making decisions to please shortsighted shareholders at the 
expense of long-term, sustainable growth. Many of those concerned about short-
termism have called on powerful shareholders to use their influence to redirect 
managerial attention to the long term.118 Asset managers like BlackRock, whose 
clients are largely investing for long term goals such as retirement, are often 
considered particularly well-suited to resolve these concerns. In response to 
these calls, Larry Fink’s letter specifically addresses short-termism, as do similar 
public communications by State Street and Vanguard.119  
The concept of short-termism is quite broad, and over time a number of 
perceived flaws in the capital and financial markets have been categorized as 
problems of short-termism. Professor Lynne Dallas has meticulously catalogued 
the many market forces that have arguably contributed to the problems 
associated with short-termism.120 She identifies a number of structural, 
informational, behavioral and incentive problems in firms and markets that may 
contribute to short termism.121  
 
 118. See, e.g., ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE 
RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (Sept. 9, 2009), 
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf; 
CFA CTR. FOR FIN. MARKET INTEGRITY/BUS. ROUNDTABLE INST. FOR CORP. ETHICS, BREAKING THE SHORT-
TERM CYCLE: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW CORPORATE LEADERS, ASSET MANAGERS, 
INVESTORS, AND ANALYSTS CAN REFOCUS ON LONG-TERM VALUE (2006), https://www.cfainstitute.org/ 
en/advocacy/policy-positions/breaking-the-short-term-cycle; POLICY COMM. FOR THE COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., 
RESTORING TRUST IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE SIX ESSENTIAL TASKS OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND 
BUSINESS LEADERS 14–15 (2010), https://www.ced.org/pdf/Restoring-Trust-in-Corporate-Governance.pdf; 
MATTEO TONELLO, REVISITING STOCK MARKET SHORT-TERMISM (2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=938466. 
 119. Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs, supra note 2 (“Without a sense of purpose, no company, either public or 
private, can achieve its full potential. It will ultimately lose the license to operate from key stakeholders. It will 
succumb to short-term pressures.”); R. William McNabb III, An Open Letter to Directors of Public Companies 
Worldwide, VANGUARD (Aug. 31, 2017), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/governance-
letter-to-companies.pdf (“[W]e promote principles of corporate governance that we believe will enhance the 
long-term value of [our investors’] investments.”); Ronald P. O’Hanley, Proxy Letter, STATE ST. GLOB. 
ADVISORS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2017/ 
Letter-and-ESG-Guidelines.pdf (“Each year our asset stewardship team identifies specific areas that may impact 
value over the long term.”).  
 120. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance 37 J. CORP. LAW 
264 (2012). 
 121. Structural problems include how periods of low interest rates encourage firms (and individuals) to incur 
too much debt, how competition for funds among asset managers cause asset managers to invest in assets that 
will produce short term returns, and how technological advances that have increased the speed of trading have 
also increased volatility, which increases pressure on firms to engage in earnings management. Id. at 269–70, 
273. Informational asymmetries between managers and markets can also foster “myopia” by creating a prisoner’s 
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The lesson from Professor Dallas’s extensive list is that there are numerous 
potential sources of pressures on investors and managers that could lead to 
value-reducing decision-making. But, the vast majority of these pressures are 
driven by shareholders. Broadly, she points to forces that encourage investors 
and analysts to over-value the short term and the way in which those 
perspectives impact managerial decision-making.122 Any time a manager is 
making decisions based on how they will appear to the market, the perspectives 
of shareholders are driving those decisions. The many structural, informational 
and behavioral problems of investors can easily be transferred to corporate 
managers who are strongly incentivized to please their corporations’ very 
influential shareholders. Thus, the increasing influence of shareholders 
described in the prior Subpart contributes to and exacerbates “short-term” or 
otherwise misdirected pressures.  
This investor influence is feared to be value-reducing because when 
corporate managers focus narrowly on meeting investors’ imperfect demands, 
they neglect other important value-creating interests. Examples of value-
reducing activities by corporate managers include: 
“[O]ffering price discounts to temporarily increase sales, engaging in 
overproduction to lower costs of goods sold . . . and reducing discretionary 
expenses aggressively to improve margins,” such as research and 
development expenses, maintenance expenses, marketing expenses, 
employee-training expenses, or employee downsizing with the loss of 
experienced workers.123 
Many of these activities come at the expense of returns to corporate 
stakeholders such as employees and customers. These types of measures may 
allow managers to report results that appeal to investors in the short run, in the 
form of increased profits and therefore increased share prices. However, they 
may also result in less productive companies in future periods. This is a recurring 
theme in discussions of short-termism—the idea that short-termism reduces 
firms’ long term value because it causes managers to neglect value-creating 
stakeholder interests.  
This Article shifts the focus of discussion by arguing that non-shareholder 
stakeholders will always receive relatively less attention as shareholders gain 
 
dilemma between firms, incentivizing managers to provide misleading (and unsustainable) signals to the market, 
disincentivizing value creation, and causing managers to disregard useful private information about a course of 
action if that information cannot be effectively communicated to the market. Id. at 268. She argues that the 
behavioral biases of market actors contribute to short-termism by causing them to over-discount the potential 
impact of low-frequency shocks, feel excessively optimistic about the future, and follow the short-term behavior 
of groups. Id. at 270. Finally, firm managers are incentivized to engage in short term behavior for personal 
reputational and financial reasons and to maintain or bolster the firm’s reputation. See id. at 269–73. 
 122. See Dallas, supra note 120. 
 123. Dallas, supra note 120, at 278 (quoting Sugata Roychowdhury, Earnings Management Through Real 
Activities Manipulation, 42 J. ACCT. & ECON. 335, 336 (2006)); cf. DOMINIC BARTON ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. 
INST., MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SHORT-TERMISM 7 (2017) (finding that firms with a long-term 
focus invested more in R&D, hired more employees, and exhibited better financial performance than those with 
a short-term focus). 
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more influence. This is so regardless of who those shareholders are and what 
their investment horizon might be. Managerial attention is a finite resource. A 
greater proportion of managerial attention to shareholders must mean a smaller 
proportion devoted to other stakeholders. Therefore, problems of value-reducing 
stakeholder neglect are really problems of disproportionate shareholder power, 
broadly, which need not be attributable to time horizon, or short-termism. 
The concept of short-termism, while widely discussed, is not universally 
accepted. A number of empirical studies have sought to measure whether short-
termism exists and the extent to which it is caused by shareholder pressures. The 
results have pointed in divergent directions.124 As was the case for the studies of 
stakeholder engagement discussed in Subpart I.B above, the potential sources of 
short-term pressure are so diverse and interconnected, that conclusively proving 
or disproving the existence of this phenomenon is likely an insurmountable task, 
at least in the foreseeable future.  
A prominent theoretical objection to the concept of short-termism is its 
implications for the existence of efficient capital markets.125 If shareholders are 
regularly able to force changes in a corporation that lead to a short-term increase 
in stock price, that implies that the market for these stocks is regularly 
inefficient. In an efficient market, the current price of a stock should reflect all 
publicly available information about the future cash flows to the company, and 
so any expected future decrease should be reflected today.  
These objections lose much of their force when the problem is framed as 
arising from a misallocation of managerial attention and not as a question of 
investment horizon. Viewed in this light, the most relevant characteristics of the 
capital markets identified by the short-termism discussion are: (1) the substantial 
influence that shareholders have over corporate managers; (2) the resultant 
 
 124. Studies supporting the existence of short-termism include: John Asker et al., Corporate Investment and 
Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 342, 384 (2015) (finding that public companies whose 
stock prices are most sensitive to earnings news are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities); 
Francois Brochet et al., Speaking of the Short-Term: Disclosure Horizon and Managerial Myopia, 20 REV. 
ACCT. STUD. 1122, 1132 tbl.3 (2015) (finding the content of corporate conference calls indicate myopic behavior 
among managers); Martijn Cremers et al., Short-Term Investors, Long-Term Investments, and Firm Value 
(unpublished working paper) (finding that an inflow of short-term institutional investors predicts an increase in 
the likelihood that firms cut investment in research and development). Studies questioning the existence of a 
short termism problem include: Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1117 (2015) (finding no evidence that hedge fund activism causes temporary short term 
stock price increases); Alex Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64 J. 
FIN. 2481, 2481–82 (2009) (showing that transient shareholders in the U.S. markets can encourage investment); 
and Joel F. Houston et al., To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings 
Guidance, 27 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 143, 179 (2010) (finding no increase in long-term investment after firms 
cease earnings guidance). 
 125. See Robert Anderson IV, The Long and Short of Corporate Governance, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 19, 
31 (2015); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden 
Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 532–33 (2002); Tim Worstall, The Problem With Hillary: If Investors Are Short 
Term Then How Can We Have Investment Bubbles?, FORBES (Aug. 2, 2015, 5:26 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/08/02/the-problem-with-hillary-if-investors-are-short-term-
then-how-can-we-have-investment-bubbles/#8ba8a6fd9775.   
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devaluation of the needs and preferences of other stakeholders; and (3) the 
consequent loss in firm value. Focusing on these characteristics means that 
empirical tests of changes in firm value at different points in time are 
substantially less relevant because the argument is no longer dependent on a 
particular time frame. Moreover, the efficient markets objection loses its 
relevance because the market’s ability to value the company is not deemed to 
change over time. Rather, shareholders are deemed consistently unable to 
accurately value stakeholder relationships across time periods.126 The remainder 
of this Article will therefore use the term “managerial fixation” to refer to this 
problem in order to emphasize the central role played by managers’ 
disproportionate attention to shareholders, as a class, and leave to the side 
questions of time horizon. 
***** 
As the above discussion has demonstrated, the problem of agency costs 
arising from the “separation of ownership and control” has substantially 
diminished. However, resolving this problem does not appear to have resulted 
in optimally performing corporations. Instead, new concerns about short-
termism have arisen, which point to the existence of value-reducing managerial 
fixation that agency cost theories cannot explain.127 The following Part describes 
an alternative theory of the corporation, the team production theory, which 
predicts and provides an explanation for these apparent problematic 
consequences of the shareholder empowerment trend. 
III.  TEAM PRODUCTION AND SHAREHOLDER LIMITATIONS 
Contrary to the theories focused on shareholder-manager agency costs 
discussed above, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production theory of 
corporate law asserts that shareholders’ rights are properly limited. The team 
production theory128 focuses on an alternate economic problem faced by 
corporations—that of team production—to explain the roles of shareholders, 
corporate boards and other corporate constituencies. The team production theory 
provides a compelling explanation for the concerns about managerial fixation 
that have arisen in the wake of a great wave of shareholder empowerment. 
However, it leaves unanswered questions about shareholders’ limited ability to 
correct for managerial fixation. This Part describes the team production theory’s 
explanatory power and proposes a response to those unanswered questions. 
 
 126. See infra Subpart III.B for a description of this limitation. 
 127. Dallas, supra note 120, at 273 (“Unlike the well-known agency cost theory, which holds that agency 
costs are minimized when managers are disciplined by market pressures . . . managerial myopia theories explain 
why managers ‘caring too much’ about current stock prices leads to myopic decision making.”). 
 128. As is discussed below, Blair and Stout’s team production theory of corporate law is based on theoretical 
work about team production in economic literature. Unless otherwise specified, all references to “team 
production” or the “team production theory” herein refer to Blair and Stout’s team production theory of corporate 
law, and not the underlying economic theories. 
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A. TEAM PRODUCTION 
1. Overview of the Team Production Theory of Corporate Law 
The team production theory asserts that viewing shareholders as the owners 
of corporate assets who should be empowered to control those assets is not only 
normatively undesirable but also descriptively inaccurate. As a descriptive 
matter, it acknowledges that equity owners are, indeed, the common owners of 
firm assets in businesses formed as proprietorships, partnerships and closely 
held firms. Corporations, and especially publicly held corporations, however, 
are quite different. As was discussed in Subpart I.A above, the corporate form 
originated from a desire to ensure equity capital contributors could not freely 
withdraw their assets from the business.129 Thus, the forfeiture of control over 
assets is a fundamental characteristic of the corporate form. This is why 
corporate shareholders don’t exhibit any of the rights in a corporation that are 
associated with ownership or control and why their rights to control the 
corporation and its assets are explicitly and substantially limited by law.130  
As a normative matter, the team production theory does not view 
shareholder-manager agency costs as the primary economic problem faced by 
corporations because shareholder equity is not the only input necessary for 
corporate production. Instead, this theory focuses on the problem of organizing 
joint production in teams, or “team production.”  
The team production problem is an economic problem that has been studied 
by economists since the 1970s.131 It arises when the production of some output 
requires the inputs of many individuals.132 The whole of the output produced by 
the team will be greater than the sum of the inputs produced by any individual,133 
and so there will be greater positive contribution to the economy if teams come 
together to jointly produce things. However, making a contribution to the team 
 
 129. This allows more security for long-term business endeavors. See supra Subpart I.A. 
 130. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 261; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211–12, 220, 251(c), 327 (2020). 
Nonetheless, shareholders do have rights that other stakeholders do not have. Blair and Stout acknowledge that 
the mere fact that shareholders are the only stakeholder group with any such rights does seem to imply that they 
enjoy a favored position vis-à-vis other stakeholders. Nonetheless, they proffer two possible explanations as to 
why shareholders alone have voting rights. First, shareholder voting rights, when properly limited, may serve 
the interests of all stakeholder groups, not just shareholders. A poorly managed corporation can compromise 
returns to all team members, but granting voting rights to all stakeholders would be untenable. So, the 
shareholders serve as a backstop in instances of extreme managerial misconduct. Second, the voting rights could 
be seen as compensation to shareholders for the unique risks they take on as equity investors. Equity investors 
have much less access to management, and their voting rights can be seen as making up for that distance. Blair 
& Stout, supra note 12, at 312–14. 
 131. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 265 (“One of the first serious attempts by economists to explore the 
problem of organizing joint production in teams can be found in a 1972 paper . . . .” (citing Armen A. Alchian 
& Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 
(1972))). 
 132. Id. at 265 (“[D]efined team production as ‘production in which 1) several types of resources are 
used . . . 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 3) not all 
resources used in team production belong to one person.’” (citing Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 131)). 
 133. Id. at 269. 
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involves uncertainty and therefore risk with respect to whether any one 
contributor of resources will be adequately compensated for her contribution. 
Individuals will be unwilling to contribute to the team if they do not have 
assurances that they will receive a share of the profits from the production that 
exceeds their opportunity cost of participating. And, the profits from production 
will be a function of the quality and quantity of contributions to the team.134 The 
economic problem, then, is how to attract and maintain high-quality inputs to 
the team.135 
While potential team members could hypothetically contract to an 
agreement about allocating profits, there is no efficient time at which team 
members could do so. If the team members agree ex ante to a division of the 
surplus, all team members will have incentives to shirk. However, if they attempt 
to divide up shares of profit ex post, all team members will be incentivized to 
engage in rent-seeking, the prospect of which could deter any individual from 
contributing to the team in the first place.136 
One solution to this problem identified in the economic literature is to 
insert an outsider into the productive activity who can control the team’s assets, 
allocate assets among team members, and fire individual team members or break 
up the team.137 While this arrangement requires the individual team members to 
cede some control of their productive capacity, it also limits shirking and deters 
rent seeking so that the team members feel confident they will receive an 
adequate share of the profit generated by the team production. The outsider is 
referred to as a “mediating hierarch” whose role is to “exercise [] control in a 
fashion that maximizes the joint welfare of the team as a whole.”138 The 
mediating hierarch is charged with ensuring potential team contributors that 
their expected return from engaging in team production exceeds the cost of 
ceding some control over their productive capacity. 
Corporations are entities engaged in team production. They require the 
“firm-specific investments” of many—equity capital, lending, supplies, labor, 
customers, environmental resources—in order to produce goods and services 
that we hope will have a net positive social impact on the economy.139 Blair and 
 
 134. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 131, at 778–79. 
 135. While early work on the economic problem of team production emphasized designing incentives to 
prevent shirking among employees once they were part of the firm. Id.; see also Bengt Holmstrom, Moral 
Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECONOMICS 324 (1982). Blair and Stout rely more heavily on the later work of 
Rajan and Zingales, which emphasized the prior need to attract specific investments to the firm before the 
problem of preventing shirking can ever arise. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the 
Firm, 113 Q.J. ECONOMICS 387, 390 (1998). 
 136. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 249-50. 
 137. Id. at 274 (citing Rajan & Zingales, supra note 135, at 422). 
 138. Id. at 271. 
 139. While early economic work on team production focused on the productive inputs of employees—see 
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 131, and Holmstrom, supra note 135—Blair and Stout explicitly expand the 
realm of relevant team members to also include shareholders, creditors, and community members, etc. on the 
basis that these groups also make firm-specific investments that contribute to the corporation’s productive 
capacity. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 276 n.61.  
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Stout argue that in corporations, the board of directors plays the role of the 
mediating hierarch.140 The board’s allegiances, therefore, should be not only to 
shareholders, but to all the individuals whose “firm-specific investments” are 
essential to optimizing corporate output. In the board’s role hiring and 
supervising the chief executive officer, it should ensure that the CEO’s 
allegiances are similarly broad. This theory acknowledges that, while 
shareholder capital, and oversight, are essential to corporate output, so are the 
inputs of many other stakeholders.141 The board should thus act as a mediating 
hierarch “whose job is to balance team members’ competing interests in a 
fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays 
together.”142  
Because the team production theory argues that boards should be 
accountable to all team members, it views shareholders’ control rights as 
properly limited. That is, the fact that shareholders have limited rights under 
corporate law, and that they face collective action problems in exercising those 
rights, is a positive attribute, not a flaw, in corporate law.143 If shareholders (or 
any other team member) were able to easily use their control rights to advocate 
for their own self-interest, this would disrupt the equilibrium of stakeholder 
interests that the board is tasked with maintaining, and thereby disincentivize the 
contribution of “firm-specific investments” from the neglected stakeholders.144  
In more concrete terms, if shareholders are disproportionately influential, 
corporate managers will devote a larger proportion of their attention to 
shareholders and therefore a smaller proportion of their attention to other 
stakeholders, such as employees. A decreased share of attention to employees 
will cause managers to be less familiar with or attentive to the preferences and 
desires of their employees. If, as a consequence, employee interests are 
neglected, we should expect the firm to attract fewer, or less qualified, 
employees. With a smaller or less qualified workforce, production will suffer as 
will profit, or firm value. 
Under the team production theory it is therefore desirable that shareholders 
may only be able to exert control in cases of extreme managerial misconduct so 
that managers can devote adequate attention to all stakeholders. Only by doing 
so can they attract to the firm the quality and quantity of inputs necessary for 
maximizing firm value.145 
 
 140. Id. at 319. 
 141. Id. at 278. 
 142. Id. at 281. 
 143. Id. at 321–22. 
 144. John Armour et al., Agency Problems, Legal Strategies and Enforcement 3 (European Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 135/2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436555 (noting that agency costs 
exist between a firm and its non-shareholder stakeholders). 
 145. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 312.   
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2. Implications for Current Trends 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s seminal article developing the team 
production theory was published in 1999,146 at a time when the trend toward 
increased shareholder power was in motion, but shareholders had not yet reached 
the level of unprecedented influence that they enjoy today.147 However, applying 
the theory to the current state of the U.S. equity markets—in which shareholders 
have very substantial influence over corporate managers—the team production 
theory would predict an outcome that substantially resembles current concerns 
about short-termism, or managerial fixation. 
The team production theory predicts that if shareholders were to amass 
substantial influence over management, management would be forced to devote 
relatively less attention to the needs of other corporate stakeholders, and we 
would expect that their interests would be neglected, to the detriment of 
corporate production. Recent concerns about short-termism, or managerial 
fixation, point to a fear that this outcome has, indeed, come to pass. Shareholders 
in the public U.S. equity markets currently exert an unprecedented level of 
influence over corporate managers.148 In the wake of this change came 
discussions of short-termism, which this Article argues is actually a problem of 
managerial fixation. These discussions point to the neglect of non-shareholder 
stakeholders such as employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and 
communities.149 These constituencies are stakeholders that make firm-specific 
investments under the team production theory.150 
The team production theory therefore provides a useful starting point to 
explain the managerial fixation that has arisen in the wake of shareholder 
empowerment. It implies that the empowerment of shareholders has led to the 
neglect of other stakeholders and that disproportionately powerful shareholders 
can always be expected to have this result. It also explains why shareholder 
empowerment not only negatively impacts stakeholders, but also can reduce the 
value of firms. It points out that corporations need the inputs of all their 
stakeholders to produce goods and services. If stakeholders’ interests are not 
adequately addressed, the corporation will not succeed in attracting the mix of 
stakeholder inputs to the firm that will optimize the corporation’s output. 
Team production thereby also provides an answer to the question of what 
market changes precipitated Larry Fink’s letter. It suggests that the very force 
that gave Larry Fink a visible public platform—shareholder empowerment—led 
to managerial fixation, calls on powerful shareholders to protect other 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Rock, supra note 9, at 1910 (discussing the process of shareholder empowerment began in the 1980s). 
 148. See e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 71, at 1022; Rock, supra note 9, at 1922–23; Bratton & Wachter, 
supra note 90, at 720–21. 
 149. Supra Subpart II.B. 
 150. The often-mentioned concerns about research, development, and innovation, while not specifically the 
direct interests of a specific group of team members, are nonetheless issues that are important to both customers 
who desire new and improved products and employees in innovative roles at the corporation. 
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stakeholder interests,151 and finally Fink’s letter and similar reactions from other 
institutions.152 
The next logical question, then, is whether this approach can work. Can we 
expect that powerful shareholders such as BlackRock can wield their influence 
so as to monitor and improve a corporation’s relationships with its other 
stakeholders? To this inquiry, team production provides a somewhat paradoxical 
response. Team production predicts two outcomes to follow from 
disproportionate shareholder empowerment: (1) that other stakeholders’ 
interests will be neglected and (2) that that neglect will come at the cost of firm 
production and value. These outcomes are paradoxical because we expect firm 
value to be of paramount concern to shareholders. Shareholders are well 
incentivized to ensure they use their influence in a manner that does not impair 
firm value. The questions remains, then, why shareholders cannot simply use 
their substantial influence to monitor other stakeholders’ interests and thereby 
reduce the costs of managerial fixation. The following Subpart explores why 
shareholders cannot be effective monitors of corporate impacts on other 
stakeholders, in spite of their financial incentives to do so. 
B. SHAREHOLDER LIMITATIONS 
Team production explains how managerial attention to non-shareholder 
stakeholders promotes firm value by improving the quality or quantity of those 
stakeholders’ inputs. A number of studies support this connection between 
stakeholder management and increasing firm value,153 and the Fink letter and 
the trend of which it is a part are an acknowledgment by market participants, 
including shareholders, that attention to other stakeholders is necessary to 
maximize shareholder returns.154 Thus, at least initially, there appears to be logic 
to the approach of calling on shareholders to resolve problems of managerial 
fixation. If institutional investors are currently the constituency with the greatest 
influence over management decision-making, it would seem a fitting solution to 
have them use their influence to ensure corporate managers are effectively 
tending to the interests of other stakeholder groups. 
Nonetheless, while this coincidence of interests provides investors with the 
incentives to advocate for other stakeholders, insurmountable information 
asymmetries prevent them from accessing the information necessary to do so 
effectively. Only the stakeholders themselves can provide the necessary 
information about what they require to induce their participation in the corporate 
team, and they do not reveal this information to shareholders. The remainder of 
 
 151. See Dominic Barton & Marc Wiseman, Focusing Capital on the Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–
Feb. 2014, https://hbr.org/2014/01/focusing-capital-on-the-long-term; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 
720–21; Kahan & Rock, supra note 76, at 995–98; Rock, supra note 9, at 1910–11. 
 152. See supra note 115. 
 153. See supra Subpart I.B and accompanying notes 27–36. 
 154. But see supra note 6. 
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this Subpart explores the origins of these information asymmetries and the 
obstacles to overcoming them. 
1. Incomplete Stakeholder Contracts  
As was discussed in Subpart II.A.1 above, agency cost theories that argue 
in favor of shareholder empowerment are based on the assumption that contracts 
with all non-shareholder stakeholders are complete. Discussions of “contracts” 
in this context refer to a broad category of agreements between corporations and 
their stakeholders. These agreements do not always take the form of legally 
binding documents signed by both parties. The term “contracts” here includes 
legally binding agreements, but also less formal “relationships characterized by 
reciprocal expectations and behavior.”155 To say that a contract is complete is to 
say that every possible contingency is contemplated by the contract.156 If a 
contract is complete, then no matter what state of the world arises in the future, 
the contract will tell the parties exactly what their obligations are in that scenario. 
However, in reality, creating a complete contract is virtually impossible. As 
Professors Paul Milgrom and John Roberts describe: 
Complete contracting requires freely imagining all the myriad contingencies 
that might arise during the contract term, costlessly determining the 
appropriate actions and division of income to take in each contingency, 
describing all these verbally with enough precision that the terms of the 
contract are clear, arriving at an agreement on these terms, and doing all this 
so that the parties to the contract are motivated to follow its terms.157 
It is easy to see that such a level of specificity is not realistically possible 
in almost all cases, as the number of future states of the world is probably 
infinite. Thus, the classical assumption that all contracts with non-shareholder 
stakeholders are complete is not true.158 Instead, these contracts will be 
incomplete to varying degrees.  
Some stakeholder contracts, such as those with lenders, may be rather 
detailed even if incomplete. Contracts for corporate loans are generally 
negotiated at length among sophisticated parties with sophisticated lawyers, and 
contemplate a number of future scenarios. Nonetheless, the option for future 
renegotiation of terms always remains open, uncontemplated future states of the 
world are always possible,159 and a healthy corporation will negotiate a number 
of debt agreements over the course of its life. Thus, corporate managers will 
have repeated opportunities to negotiate and renegotiate the terms of debt over 
 
 155. William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 388 (1990) 
(suggesting that the term “contracting relationships” may better capture this broader conception of “contracts”). 
 156. Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Control, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 1731, 1732 (2017). 
 157. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 52, at 289. 
 158. Hart, supra note 156, at 1732 (“Actual contracts are not like this, as lawyers have realized for a long 
time.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Gregory H. Shill, Boilerplate Shock: Sovereign Debt Contracts as Incubators of Systemic 
Risk, 89 TUL. L. REV. 751, 755 (2015) (discussing how standard contract terms in debt contracts can have 
unexpectedly detrimental effects in the event of large economic shocks). 
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time. Other stakeholder contracts, such as corporations’ agreements with at-will 
employees are highly incomplete in that they have very few specified terms.160 
Most U.S. employees are employed “at-will” and thus not subject to any specific 
employment contract.161 So, the bargain between an employee and her employer 
about most employment terms—schedule, work responsibilities, grounds for 
termination—are not specified ex ante but rather allow for flexibility over time. 
Because of the existence of these contractual gaps, the members of a 
particular stakeholder group are continually engaged in ongoing negotiations 
with the corporations to fill in these gaps as new situations arise. Professors 
Edward Rock and Michael Wachter have described how, in non-union 
workplaces, norms have arisen according to which employers will only 
terminate employees for-cause, even though the at-will employment doctrine 
requires no such constraint.162 They explain that these norms have developed 
because if potential employees knew that they could be terminated arbitrarily, 
they would not choose to join the firm in the first place.163 That is, in the jargon 
of team production, employees need ex ante assurance that the corporation’s 
management will act as an effective mediating hierarch to protect their interests 
adequately before they will commit their firm specific investments to the 
corporation. A norm against arbitrary termination provides some assurance to 
potential employees that the firm will not act in a way that makes an employee’s 
choice to join the firm ex post costly to the employee.164 Thus, by devoting 
resources and attention to employee needs and preferences, a corporation can 
glean information from employees and potential employees about what 
assurances are necessary to promote employee recruitment, retention, and 
productivity. It can then fill contractual gaps in a way that will optimally attract 
employees to the firm. 
Similar scenarios can be crafted for other stakeholder groups. Consumers 
present a very similar case because customer contracts are usually similarly 
incomplete. Businesses, fundamentally, should be striving to provide goods and 
services demanded by their consumers. They should be engaging with their 
consumers to understand what products and services will induce the consumers 
to purchase the corporation’s goods or services. Even in the realm of more highly 
specified contracts such as a loan agreement, when an unanticipated event occurs 
that, for example, could lead to the corporation not meeting one of its covenants, 
 
 160. Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 1917 (describing non-union internal labor markets as examples of 
highly incomplete contracts). 
 161. The at-will employment presumption, which is recognized in all U.S. states except Montana, is stated 
as, “[a]bsent an agreement, statutory provision, or public-policy rule to the contrary, an employment relationship 
is terminable at the will of either party.” RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 3.01 (AM. LAW INST., 2006). 
 162. Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 1917. 
 163. Id. at 1930 (“If the firm could discharge without cause, it could use such a threat to appropriate an 
additional share of the joint surplus ex post. The threat of such ex post appropriation would . . . stand in the way 
of optimal investments in match ex ante.”). 
 164. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 272. 
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the corporation must negotiate with the creditor to an outcome that preserves as 
much of the firm’s value as possible.  
Given that stakeholder relationships are not, in fact, complete contracts, 
residual returns can be distributed not only to shareholders, but also to these 
other stakeholders as a result of the negotiation of their unspecified contract 
terms. This means that the unspecified contract terms are areas where residual 
control is exercised.165 That is, the right to make decisions about undefined 
contract terms is part of the residual control, and it can either be granted to 
shareholders (as agency cost theories suggest) or to corporate managers (via the 
board as “mediating hierarch,” as the team production theory suggests). The 
question then becomes which group—shareholders or managers—can exercise 
this control in a manner that maximizes firm value. 
A key observation in answering this question is that a corporation’s 
relationships with its stakeholders are its means to creating value. It cannot 
produce profit without employees, customers, and other inputs.166 Therefore, 
exercising residual control is not simply a matter of making choices about how 
to distribute the residual returns among stakeholders. Rather, the quantity of 
residual return available for distribution is a function of the manner in which 
residual control is exercised. So, maximizing profit, and thus the residual return, 
depends on engaging with stakeholders in a manner that optimizes the quality 
and quantity of their inputs to the corporation. Control over these decisions 
should therefore go to the party that is best able to negotiate stakeholder 
contracts. The following two Subparts describe why shareholders are not the 
best-equipped party. 
2. Information Asymmetries 
When attention to stakeholder concerns is expected to have a positive 
impact on share price, shareholders will nonetheless be poorly positioned to 
monitor management attention to these issues due to information asymmetries 
between shareholders and managers.  
Underlying agency cost theories is an assumption that shareholders have 
all the information they need to effectively maximize firm value. If markets were 
strong form efficient—that is, if all material public and nonpublic information 
about a company were incorporated into its stock price—then it would be 
appropriate for boards to act as agents that specifically and exclusively do the 
bidding of shareholders.167 If shareholders possessed all possible information 
about the value of the firm, they would then always be the group best positioned 
to maximize firm value. However, most can agree that markets are not strong 
 
 165. Hart, supra note 156, at 1732. 
 166. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART 12 (2010) (“[T]he 
only way to maximize value sustainably is to satisfy stakeholder interests.”); supra Subpart I.B. 
 167. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 696 (“[S]trong-form efficiency would support a nearly 
unassailable case for shareholder empowerment.”). 
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form efficient.168 Instead, firm managers have private information to which the 
firm’s shareholders do not have access, so informational asymmetries exist 
between corporate managers and shareholders.169 Consequently, markets will 
not always accurately value a firm,170 and mediating between market signals and 
inside information becomes what Professors William Bratton and Michael 
Wachter call the “intrinsic management function.”171 That is, what we want from 
corporate managers is that they combine signals from the market with the inside 
information about the company that they have, and use that to make management 
decisions that maximize firm value. 
In their article analyzing the role of shareholder empowerment in the 2008 
financial crisis, Bratton and Wachter describe the crisis as having been 
precipitated by managers who were too focused on meeting the demands of 
imperfectly informed shareholders.172 In the years preceding the financial crisis, 
high-risk business strategies worked very well in the sense that they resulted in 
high returns to shareholders.173 Shareholder appetite for these high returns 
strongly incentivized managers to continue investing in mortgage-backed 
securities, even as it became increasingly evident that the mortgage bubble was 
unsustainable and the magnitude of the risks involved was extraordinary. 
Managers of financial firms had access to information about these risks that 
shareholders did not have, but strong pressures from shareholders seeking ever-
increasing returns prevented most managers from acting on this inside 
information.174 The result, we now know, was that many mispriced assets 
plummeted in value as housing prices began to fall, forcing a liquidity crisis, an 
enormous government bailout, and a deep economic recession. 
Focusing on the 2008 financial crisis, Bratton and Wachter’s discussion 
emphasizes unobservable financial risk that made shareholder signals 
dramatically inefficient in the lead up to the crash.175 However, financial risk is 
not the only type of information that can be unobservable to shareholders. The 
effects of many stakeholder-affecting management decisions are similarly 
unobservable to shareholders because this information is revealed during the 
internal and ongoing negotiation of incomplete contract terms with those 
stakeholders. The management of stakeholder relationships happens on an 
ongoing basis within the corporation, and managers therefore have access to 
 
 168. COLIN READ, THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIST: BACHELIER, SAMUELSON, FAMA, ROSS, TOBIN, 
AND SHILLER 105 (2013); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 691. 
 169. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 696–97. 
 170. Id. at 696 (“Information asymmetries make it difficult for the market to project accurately the free cash 
flows that the corporation will produce.”). 
 171. Id. at 697. 
 172. See id. at 656. 
 173. Id. at 721. 
 174. Id. at 722 (“[T]he result of not giving the market what it wants can be painful. The new corporate policy 
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information about those negotiations that shareholders do not have.176 This 
asymmetry of information means that shareholders cannot incorporate this 
information into their assessment of the firm’s value, so managing to shareholder 
expectations cannot be expected to maximize the value created by these 
relationships. Shareholder opinions about how to optimize stakeholder 
relationships will not be as well-informed as the opinions of managers. So, 
managing to shareholder expectations will force managers to ignore value-
enhancing information to which they have ready access, to the detriment of firm 
value.177 
3. Challenges to Overcoming Information Asymmetries 
If informational asymmetries prevent shareholders from effectively acting 
on their incentives to monitor and protect other stakeholder interests, the next 
logical question is whether those information asymmetries can be overcome by 
transferring to shareholders the information they lack. This Subpart argues that 
they cannot for at least two reasons: (1) the passive nature of public stock market 
investments and (2) the complexity, and thus costs, of reporting on stakeholder 
outcomes. 
First, the passivity of shareholders is a characteristic fundamental to public 
stock markets.178 Blair and Stout’s team production theory is explicitly a theory 
of public corporations.179 Shareholders in public corporations are passive, 
retrospective monitors of corporate behavior180 who voluntarily cede ultimate 
control to the board of directors.181 While modern shareholders may have 
substantial influence over corporate managers, including the board of directors, 
it is an influence that originates outside the corporation. Public shareholders are 
 
 176. One notable exception to this may be the instance in which a shareholder represents an important 
constituent group of the corporation. Professor David Webber has described in detail the success that pension 
funds have had in engaging in shareholder activism on behalf of workers. WEBBER, supra note 111, at 178–79. 
In such a case, the shareholder may have better information than usual about the stakeholder relationship. Id. 
However, such situations are limited to a unique class of shareholders and unique instances of alignment between 
those shareholders and stakeholder issues facing the corporation. Id. These instances, while an important antidote 
to managerial fixation, do not overcome the more general observation that most shareholders will lack adequate 
information about most stakeholder relationships to effectively monitor those relationships. Id. 
 177. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
489, 506 (2013) (“[A]s you move away from an offer on the table to buy the company . . . to continuous business 
decisionmaking over time, the meaning of a market-price signal becomes less and less clear and information 
asymmetries present more of a problem.”). 
 178. The term “passive” is used here in a broad sense to refer to a fundamental characteristic of public stock 
markets. While, the term “passive” is often also used to describe as class of investment funds that are not actively 
managed, that is a much narrower concept and is not the intended meaning here. 
 179. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 256 (“[T]he team production approach may help explain why so many 
large enterprises are organized as publicly-traded corporations, rather than as partnerships, limited liability 
corporations, closely held companies, or other business forms that give investors tighter control.”). 
 180. Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 9–10 (2001). 
 181. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2020). 
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not involved in managing the internal workings of the firm.182 This is in stark 
contrast to privately owned businesses that are often closely held by their 
founders or by professional private equity or venture capital firms. In privately 
held firms, it is common that equity holders will be intimately involved in firm 
management.183 The choice to operate as a public firm, on the other hand, is a 
choice to abandon that model and instead distribute equity to dispersed public 
shareholders.184 Similarly, a choice by an investor to purchase shares of a 
publicly traded corporation is a choice to invest in a highly liquid asset that will 
not require the investor’s ongoing attention as a manager.185 The advantages of 
this passivity would be lost if shareholders were to engage deeply in overseeing 
the internal operations of the corporation. Only an intimate involvement in the 
internal affairs of the corporation could meaningfully reduce the stakeholder 
information asymmetries between managers and shareholders. By their nature, 
public shareholders are neither positioned nor equipped to engage in this type of 
involvement. 
Second, information about a corporation’s relationships with its many 
stakeholders is qualitatively very distinct from financial information and 
therefore not readily reduced to numerical metrics. Those working in the area of 
social enterprise have been at the forefront of developing metrics to measure 
social output. The issue has continuously presented numerous challenges, not 
the least of which is the sheer number of stakeholders affected by business 
actions. Professor Sarah Dadush, in an extensive analysis of two leading 
indicators used in the impact investing investment market, concluded that these 
“tools do not in fact measure impact because [social and environmental impacts 
are] too complicated and controversial to evaluate.”186 Professor Galit Sarfaty 
conducted an extensive study of the “leading standard for corporate 
sustainability reporting,”187 and concluded that the use of quantitative indicators 
to measure corporate sustainability is problematic.188 Among other issues, the 
indicators promote only superficial compliance while their weaknesses are often 
overlooked due to the “authoritative quality of numbers.”189 Thus, the most 
extensive recent efforts to create reporting metrics on social outcomes have 
substantial deficiencies. 
 
 182. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008) (“[I]t is well established that 
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 183. Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 281, 251–52 n.8–9 (describing how most state laws do not require 
private firms to operate through a board and instead default to direct management by equity owners). 
 184. Id. at 322. 
 185. Blair, supra note 17, at 43–44. 
 186. Sarah Dadush, Impact Investment Indicators: A Critical Assessment, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS 
392, 423 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012). 
 187. Galit A. Sarfaty, Measuring Corporate Accountability Through Global Indicators, in THE QUIET 
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Moreover, the types of stakeholder interests that are most relevant to firm 
value will differ from corporation to corporation. Different corporations require 
different employees, have different customers, and have unique relationships 
with their other stakeholders. One key characteristic of financial reporting under 
the U.S. securities laws that has made that disclosure system effective is that it 
requires standardized reporting that is comparable across companies.190 This 
type of standardization is not reasonably achievable in the realm of stakeholder 
relationships because the relevant stakeholder groups and the relevant aspects of 
those relationships will vary across companies. Moreover, these relationships 
are vast, complex and dynamic. As a corporation’s business strategy changes 
over time, the optimal mix of stakeholder inputs will also change. Thus, the 
relevant data points for disclosure would be a constantly moving target. Any 
attempt to comprehensively report on stakeholder relationships would be 
prohibitively expensive due to the ongoing and nuanced nature of these 
relationships.191 As Professors Rock and Wachter have noted, “[i]t is always 
more difficult to prove a case to a third party than to learn the facts 
independently.”192 Moreover, very detailed disclosure on stakeholder 
relationships would likely reveal information about internal strategy that could 
compromise corporations’ competitive positions. Managerial attention is 
therefore best focused on managing the corporation’s incomplete contracts with 
its stakeholders in a manner that induces optimal contributions to the firm rather 
than attempting to convey this information to external shareholders. 
4. Possible Shareholder Interventions 
In theory, we can imagine an extreme version of shareholder input on 
stakeholder matters, with shareholders opining on very specific aspects of 
stakeholder relationships, such as specific employment policies. The foregoing 
discussion predicts that they would do so ineffectively. In practice, however, it 
is very unlikely that shareholder input on these issues would take such specific 
form. As described above, the trend of shareholder empowerment has been 
driven by the increased prominence of institutional investors, the largest of 
which own shares in thousands of companies around the world. It is implausible 
that these large asset managers would involve themselves on such a granular 
level with internal corporate policies. Doing so across their enormous portfolios 
would be prohibitively costly. 
A more plausible scenario envisions shareholders asking companies for 
more generic indicators that they believe represent good stakeholder 
management. Indeed, the Fink letter and similar communications from other 
 
 190. Mary Jo White, Chair, The Path Forward on Disclosure, SEC (Oct. 15, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch101513mjw#_ftn14 (“[T]he Commission adopted the first version of 
Regulation S-K—an overarching single, uniform set of rules that form the core of the integrated disclosure 
regime that we have today.”). 
 191. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 177, at 506 (“Complete disclosure is not cost-beneficial, period.”). 
 192. Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 1932. 
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large institutional investors has sent precisely this message to public companies, 
and companies have begun to respond.193 Lawyers from the prestigious 
corporate law firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP recently advised their 
corporate clients as follows: 
[W]e are starting to see evidence, through the annual letters, interviews and 
other public-facing interactions, that investors have become more 
sophisticated about what they expect from companies . . . . [T]he recent 
letters and sentiments express nuanced and increasingly specific views about 
investor expectations, and companies that wish to court favorable 
impressions would be wise to understand the individual expectations.  
. . . . 
[T]hat ideally results in taking investor concerns into consideration when 
crafting disclosure, ESG reports, investor day presentations, analyst calls and 
other forums for public interaction.194  
Given that these messages from institutional investors appear to have had 
real effects on the behavior of corporate managers, the most innocuous result of 
this messaging would be that it does not meaningfully impact how corporate 
managers manage their other stakeholder relationships. Perhaps corporate 
managers believe that shareholders, despite their messaging, will not 
meaningfully follow up on these public requests. In such a case, the costs to the 
corporation would be only the costs of compliance with the shareholders’ 
requests. Though the quote above suggests this cost is not insignificant. 
If, however, such requests by shareholders impact management activities 
in any way, it will circumscribe the decisions left available to the manager, 
reducing her agility in responding to changes in the firm or the product markets. 
For example, if shareholders request or prefer certain results on customer 
retention, a desire to please shareholders could lead managers to ignore new and 
potentially profitable market segments if doing so meant losing existing 
customers. Or, if management implements shareholder-approved employment 
policies, those policies will not be specific to any one firm and are unlikely to 
fit within the unique culture of any one company. The possible ways in which 
this intervention could play out are infinite, but the common result is that if 
managerial decisions about stakeholder relationships are driven by shareholder 
expectations, managers will be left with less flexibility to incorporate their 
superior information into these decisions. 
So, direct shareholder involvement in stakeholder relationships is not likely 
to occur. However, less specific shareholder interventions can still circumscribe 
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managerial options in ways that could force the firm to ignore or undervalue 
value-creating stakeholder information. 
 
***** 
Information asymmetries exist between public shareholders and the 
corporations in which they invest that make shareholders unable to effectively 
monitor managers’ attention to other stakeholders, and reporting to shareholders 
cannot solve this asymmetry due to the nature of the information. The result is 
that corporate managers will only be able to engage effectively with other 
stakeholders if they are not unduly beholden to the preferences of shareholders. 
Therefore, as Bratton and Wachter have argued, shareholder empowerment 
should not be seen as a cure-all for perceived flaws in corporate activities,195 and 
calling on shareholders to exert their substantial influence to monitor 
stakeholder relationships will be ineffective.  
If managerial fixation is caused by shareholder empowerment but 
shareholders are ill equipped to overcome the resulting stakeholder neglect, the 
solution would seem to lie in reducing shareholders’ relative influence over 
corporate managers such that they are not in a position to opine on matters of 
stakeholder relationships. The prospect of limiting shareholder power, however, 
inevitably brings with it questions about how managers will use their newfound 
freedom. The following Subpart considers that question.  
C. TOO MANY MASTERS? 
Perhaps the most frequent objection to a broad stakeholder view of the 
corporation is that freeing corporate managers from strong shareholder oversight 
leaves them essentially unmonitored. In the words of Professors Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, “a manager told to serve two masters (a little 
for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is 
answerable to neither.”196 The crux of this concern is that any time management 
is not meeting the needs of one of its “masters,” it can always claim to be acting 
in the interest of one of its other “masters,” even if it is actually only promoting 
the self-interest of the managers themselves. 
However, this objection is convincing only if the detrimental effects of less 
shareholder oversight are greater than the detrimental effects of more 
shareholder oversight. As has been discussed herein, disproportionate 
shareholder power appears to have resulted in meaningful costs to corporations 
and their shareholders.197 Thus, the question becomes which scenario results in 
 
 195. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 90, at 672–74. 
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greater net cost (or benefit)—weaker shareholders or stronger ones. While 
attempting such a calculation is beyond the scope of this Article, some initial 
observations call into question how great a cost results from reduced shareholder 
influence. 
Preliminarily, reducing the relative power of shareholders is not akin to 
eliminating shareholder oversight. Instead, it means reducing the proportion of 
managerial attention dedicated to meeting shareholder demands.198 Regardless 
of the strength of shareholders’ voting power, corporate managers remain 
subject to fiduciary duties under corporate law, and only shareholders can trigger 
judicial intervention for a perceived violation of fiduciary duties.199 So, a 
reduction in relative shareholder influence will not leave corporate managers 
entirely free from shareholder oversight. Shareholders with relatively less power 
will maintain their rights granted by state corporation law and thereby their 
ability to, at a minimum, serve as a backstop against extreme managerial 
misconduct.200 
Additionally, a corporate manager subject to less than rigorous shareholder 
scrutiny will not operate with complete disregard for the well-being of the 
corporation. In terms of economic incentives, corporate executives care about 
their reputational capital and can be expected to work to ensure the companies 
they lead appear successful.201 More broadly, ample evidence demonstrates that 
humans generally are not strictly “rational” economic utility-maximizing 
beings.202 We can reasonably expect that most corporate managers care about 
doing their job well and are sometimes willing to sacrifice some amount of their 
own well-being to benefit other corporate constituencies.203 So, we can expect 
that CEOs, in the absence of tight shareholder oversight, will care about the 
success of the corporations they lead and therefore will take steps to optimize 
the stakeholder inputs available to their corporations. 
Moreover, what the team production theory elucidates is that non-
shareholder stakeholders are not a general and ill-defined group under the 
heading of “community.” Rather, they are specific groups whose inputs are 
necessary to corporate production. In a well-functioning economy, there should 
be competition for stakeholder inputs, and this market for inputs can create an 
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accountability mechanism for management.204 Displeased employees, suppliers 
or customers can decline to contribute to the corporation, to the detriment of 
production and shareholder returns.205 Since even somewhat less powerful 
shareholders will still have oversight ability, and since managers care about their 
personal and firm reputations, the need to attract stakeholder inputs will ensure 
some level of managerial attention to these groups. 
Thus, reducing the relative power of shareholders could result in additional 
rent seeking by managers, but this rent-seeking will usually be limited by the 
managers’ desire to appear to be successfully managing their companies. 
Moreover, it is far from clear how the cost of this rent-seeking behavior 
compares to the costs of managerial fixation. Given this ambiguity, the default 
to shareholder empowerment as a solution to all corporate imperfections seems 
unwarranted. And, in particular, when the problem we are trying to solve derives 
directly from disproportionate managerial attention to shareholders, as is the 
case for managerial fixation, additional shareholder influence cannot be 
expected to resolve the issue. 
IV.  POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM: USING SHAREHOLDER INFLUENCE TO REDUCE 
SHAREHOLDER INFLUENCE 
Larry Fink’s letter was a response to widespread concerns about 
managerial fixation, and the prior Part provided a theoretical explanation of both 
how managerial fixation arises and how it may interfere with corporate value 
maximization. As the above discussion has demonstrated, we cannot expect 
shareholder oversight of stakeholder relationships to solve problems of 
managerial fixation. However, the trends that have facilitated shareholder 
empowerment cannot easily be reversed. The increased popularity of 
institutional investors will not likely abate in the near future.206 Nor will the 
prominent role of proxy advisors, in spite of extensive debate about their 
usefulness.207 Scholars have called upon regulators to cease prioritizing 
shareholder empowerment,208 but much of the shareholder empowerment trend 
has been a consequence of private activity outside of regulatory control.209 And, 
the prospect of shareholders voluntarily relinquishing the additional power they 
have accumulated over the years seems unlikely. 
Thus, rather than considering how to reverse shareholder empowerment, 
this Article takes a more practical approach and offers two methods by which 
today’s powerful institutional shareholders could use their substantial influence 
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to reduce managerial fixation and effectively redirect managerial attention to 
other corporate stakeholders.  
While shareholders will not be effective in any attempts to directly monitor 
a corporation’s relationships with its many stakeholders, they can use their 
influence to promote the adoption of governance mechanisms that will 
encourage corporate managers to direct greater attention to other stakeholders. 
The proposals described below would rebalance the incentives faced by 
managers to encourage more and better stakeholder engagement. They would do 
so by realigning incentives in two ways. First, they would create explicit internal 
incentives for managers to engage with stakeholders, thereby capitalizing on 
managers’ superior information about stakeholder relationships. At least as 
importantly, however, they would also reduce the existing incentives that 
managers have to focus narrowly on shareholder demands. If shareholders 
themselves advocate for these mechanisms of stakeholder engagement, this 
sends a credible signal to managers that engaging with stakeholders is what 
shareholders desire. Thus, managers will be less fearful that by attending to the 
needs of other stakeholders, they risk their jobs or reputations due to shareholder 
dissatisfaction.210 Moreover, implementing accountability mechanisms for 
stakeholder outcomes could reduce the likelihood that managers use their 
additional flexibility to engage in rent seeking.  
A. STAKEHOLDER IMPACT REPORTING TO THE BOARD 
While public shareholders are not equipped to directly monitor a 
corporation’s relationships with its other stakeholders, doing so is precisely the 
role of the board of directors. The board is tasked with managing the 
corporation,211 which necessarily means managing the corporation’s 
relationships with its many stakeholders. Indeed, Blair and Stout posit that the 
delegation of governance to a board of directors is a defining characteristic of a 
public corporation.212 While, in practice, the CEO and other corporate 
executives will usually be the managers who directly engage with stakeholders, 
it is the board’s responsibility to oversee the activities of the executives. Thus, 
to facilitate the board’s oversight, shareholders should press for reporting on 
stakeholder outcomes to the board. 
Professors Kose John, Jongsub Lee, and Ji Yeol Jimmy Oh conducted an 
empirical study of the informational value of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) reporting by corporate managers to the board of directors.213 CSR 
activities are largely activities directed at non-shareholder stakeholder groups. 
Indeed, the study assessed firms’ CSR activities according to the categories: 
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community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, 
human rights, and products.214 These are all themes that directly affect non-
shareholder stakeholder groups. They found that CSR reporting to the board 
resulted in “more informed advising and monitoring by the board.”215 They 
further found that the informational value of the CSR reporting was greatest in 
corporations where information asymmetries between the CEO and the board 
were the greatest.216 Based on these findings, they posit that CSR reporting 
allows corporate boards to access firm-specific stakeholder information, thus 
enhancing the board’s ability to play its supervisory role.217 This result is not 
surprising given the foregoing analysis of how stakeholder relationships are 
determinative of firm value. 
Stakeholders’ firm-specific information is precisely the type of valuable 
information that managers can glean from the negotiation of their incomplete 
contracts with stakeholders, but to which shareholders have neither access nor 
the capacity to monitor effectively. The board of directors, by contrast, sits 
within the corporation, is by no means passive in its oversight of the company,218 
and indeed is legally obligated to take an active role in overseeing the 
corporation.219 Thus, by requiring that this information is shared with an 
independent board of directors,220 shareholders can reduce managerial agency 
costs by relying on the board’s superior monitoring position, rather than 
attempting to engage in that monitoring themselves. Such a requirement would 
demonstrate shareholders’ sincere interest in adequately managing to 
stakeholders while putting in place a mechanism that is capable of enforcing that 
commitment. 
B. STAKEHOLDER-FOCUSED EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION METRICS 
 When seeking to adjust corporate managers’ incentives, the most likely 
place to turn is usually to executive compensation. Traditionally, this tool has 
most often been used to align managers’ incentives with those of shareholders.221 
However, as this Article has endeavored to demonstrate, managerial incentives 
appear to have drifted too far in the direction of shareholder incentives. 
Adjusting executive compensation to include metrics for non-shareholder 
stakeholders could moderate managerial fixation. 
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A 2017 study by Professors Caroline Flammer, Bryan Hong, and Dylan 
Minor found empirical support that stakeholder-focused compensation criteria 
successfully “direct managers’ attention to stakeholders that are less salient but 
financially material to the firm in the long run.”222 This study thus provides 
compelling evidence that stakeholder compensation metrics can ameliorate 
managerial fixation. It does not conclusively prove that such metrics will always 
be successful. Indeed, as was discussed in Subpart III.B.3 above, developing 
metrics for environmental and social impacts has long proved challenging. 
Nonetheless, the prospect of internally developing stakeholder metrics that are 
specific to a particular business provides an opportunity to avoid the challenges 
that arise in attempts to create universally applicable metrics. Such internally 
developed metrics would be developed by managers with an intimate 
understanding of that particular corporation, and would be adjustable over time 
as corporate insiders determine that circumstances have changed so as to warrant 
a new or different stakeholder focus. 
The idea of incorporating stakeholder criteria into executive compensation 
formulas is not a new one. As of 2013, thirty-seven percent of S&P 500 
companies had adopted some stakeholder criteria in their compensation 
formulas.223 As of 2013, this practice was most common among emission-driven 
industries and thus focused on emissions reduction and energy efficiency 
goals.224 Nonetheless, related metrics could be developed for other corporate 
stakeholders such as employee retention or customer loyalty, and scholars and 
practitioners have already begun developing criteria for effective stakeholder 
compensation metrics.225 Thus, shareholders can use their substantial influence 
to press for executive compensation packages that include substantive criteria 
for meeting stakeholder goals that are developed by and relevant to the 
individual corporation.  
These two proposals are necessarily preliminary, and there are surely other 
possible approaches that could serve a similar function. The goal of this final 
Part is to begin thinking about ways that, given the current balance of power in 
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publicly traded corporations, shareholders can meaningfully provide 
opportunities to correct managerial fixation. 
CONCLUSION 
BlackRock’s public declaration of commitment to social impacts garnered 
substantial attention because the current structure of the U.S. equity markets has 
granted BlackRock extraordinary power. This shift of power has raised many 
concerns about how shareholders influence public corporations’ social and 
economic value. The solution to these concerns does not lie in exhorting 
shareholders to exercise their substantial power to protect the interests of other 
constituencies. Shareholders have inadequate information to do so effectively. 
Rather, the solution lies in rebalancing managerial attention among corporate 
stakeholders so that all stakeholders are incentivized to optimally contribute to 
corporate production. 
 
